F.F.1, Burma Frontier Force

Formation and Organisation

F.F.1 was formed at Kutkai under Major G.G. Pryce[1] on 14th July 1940. Kutkai was an outpost of the Northern Shan States Battalion, Burma Frontier Force, located on the Burma Road to the North of Lashio.  The detachment consisted of three companies of infantry and one squadron of mounted infantry. The companies and squadron were referred to as "Columns" and the Mounted Infantry Column was commanded by Captain J. Kennedy.[2] [3]

F.F. Detachments in the Southern Shan States & Tenasserim-December 1941 (Indian Official History)

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The Mounted Infantry Column was organised with a small Column Headquarters, two troops of Sikhs and one of Punjabi Mussalmen, each troop having 27 men.[4]  One of the infantry companies came from the Bhamo Battalion, Burma Frontier Force (Kachins) and two from the Reserve Battalion at Pyawbwe (Gurkhas). Later, towards the end of 1940, one of the Gurkha Companies left F.F.1 to help form F.F.2 and in September 1941 the Kachin Company went to form F.F.4.  These were replaced by a Kachin Company from the Northern Shan States Battalion, B.F.F. at Lashio and a Gurkha company from the Myitkyina Battalion, B.F.F.[5]

On 27th September 1941, a new organisation was authorised for F.F.1 which was now to consist of a Headquarters, one Mounted Infantry Column, two Infantry Columns and a Mechanised Column.  A new Intelligence Section was added together with an additional Demolition Squad.  At the same mortars and Thompson sub-machine guns were authorised.  The mortars and Tommy guns did not arrive until December 1941.[6]  The Mechanised Column held sufficient motor transport to move the detachment headquarters and one company at a time.  There was sufficient animal transport to move the whole detachment if required, made up of both bullock carts and pack mules, the latter managed by Chinese muleteers.[7]

Each company had been armed originally with two Lewis guns and shortly before the war with Japan one Bren gun section of six men per platoon or troop was issued.  Thompson sub-machine guns were issued one per platoon or troop. In December 1941, after the outbreak of war with Japan, a three inch mortar detachment was added to each company however ammunition did not arrive until several months later. Fortunately the mortar bombs arrived before the detachment went into action however there had been little time for training. There was one wireless set per company and one at detachment headquarters.[8]

Guarding the Frontier - The Shan States

Japanese Attacks - December 1941 (Indian Official History)

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In November 1941, Lieutenant W.R.V. Russell[9] took over command from Major Pryce.  On 27th December 1941, F.F.1 was moved via Lashio to Pangkem on the Loimwe road in the Southern Shan States where they arrived on January 5th 1942.  The Mounted Infantry Column under Captain Kennedy was detached and sent to Mongsat, South of the Loimwe road near the Mekong River.  Here the M.I. came under the command of “Turcol”, itself under the command of the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade whose headquarters were at Loimwe.  The task allotted to “Turcol” and the M.I. of F.F.1 was to patrol the frontier along a total front of over 100 miles and to stop any enemy force reaching the Kentung road from Siam. [10]  The Kachin Column under Captain E.G. Forbes,[11] together with the motor transport (and thus referred to as the “Motorised Column”), was placed under the command of the 13th Indian Infantry Brigade and sent to Loikaw with orders to patrol the road and to make contact with a company of the 1st Battalion, 18th Royal Garhwal Rifles.[12]  Both these brigades were under the command of the 1st Burma Infantry Division, the formation responsible for protecting the Southern Shan States from invasion via French Indo-China and Thailand.[13]

It had been intended for the two infantry companies at Pangkem to join the Mounted Infantry at Mongsat when supplies allowed.  However this never materialised.  Other than patrol activity across the Thai border F.F.1 saw no active service in these months other than a single raid on a Thai outpost carried out by a Captain Turner with a small force composed of the infantry from "Turcol" and a detachment of Mounted Infantry.  Around 200 casualties including 30 dead were inflicted on the Thais whilst the only friendly casualty was one man wounded.[14]

Operations on the Toungoo Front

1st Burma Division at Pyuntaza (War Diary WO 172/447)

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In February 1942, the 1st Burma Division began handing over responsibility for the defence of the Shan States to the Chinese 6th Army and moving South to defend the Sittang River valley, South of Toungoo.  The 1st Burma Infantry Brigade moved southwards in late February and early March, taking up positions around Pyu and Kyauktaga.  Both infantry columns of F.F.1 were sent, arriving ahead of the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade in the area South of Pyu on the Toungoo-Rangoon Road.[15]  By 1st March, one F.F.1 column was with the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade, which was preparing to set up advanced headquarters at Nyaungbintha, eight miles South pf Pyu.[16]  The Mounted Infantry Column and the motor transport remained in the Mongsat area until relieved by a force of Chinese around the middle of March when they moved to Taunggyi by lorry.[17]  On 10th March the 2nd Burma Infantry Brigade noted that F.F.1 had replaced the 1st Battalion, The Burma Rifles as the Divisional Reserve, the infantry battalion coming under the command of the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade.[18]

On 7th March, the 1st Burma Division received orders to attack Shwegyin and Daik-U and to exploit any success southwards to protect the northern flank of the 17th Indian Division in the Pegu area.  The right flank of this attack was given to the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade which was to attack the villages of Pyuntaza and Daik-U on the morning of 11th March.  By this date it seems that the Kachin Column, F.F.1 under Captain Forbes, had arrived and was attached to the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade.  The Column had orders to watch for enemy movements on the right flank of the Brigade in the area of Egyan (East-gyanzu) to the West of Nyaunglebin and Pyuntaza.  The Column was to revert to the direct command of the 1st Burma Division during 11th March.  The Gurkha Infantry Column, under Captain Turner, and the motor transport were expected to arrive by rail at Peinzalok, to the North of Nyaunglebin, on the morning of 12th March when the Column would join the divisional reserve (at this point the war diary of the 1st Burma Division seems to refer to Turner's column and the motor transport as the "Mechanised Column, F.F.1).[19]

The attack on the 11th March went well at first with the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade securing Pyuntaza however it was then held up at the road block South of the town.  It was then attacked by a superior Japanese force and by the end of the day the Brigade had withdrawn to a line along the Alewa Chaung.  The next day the Division was informed of orders for a withdrawal to Toungoo prior to a move to the Prome area.  It was intended that as many troops as possible would go on foot from Toungoo across the Pegu Yomas to Prome.  Major Russell, the Commanding Officer of F.F.1, was sent to reconnoitre the route.[20]

1st Burma Division Withdrawal to Toungoo and Prome (Indian Official History)

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The 1st Burma Division now undertook a two stage withdrawal to the line of the Pyu Chaung, the first stage being on the night of 13th/14th March.  Captain Turner’s Column, by now at Penwegon on the Toungoo-Rangoon road, was ordered westwards to Udo, near Chaunggwe, via Daingtaya and Myaungshe.  The motor transport column was ordered to Toungoo by rail.  Captain Forbes with the remaining infantry column at Egyan, was ordered to withdraw via Myogyaung, to the West of Pyawbyegon at the foot of the Pegu Yomas.  Turner's Column had only one encounter when two Burmans in a bullock cart fired on the advance guard but were killed by a Havildar with a Thompson sub-machine gun.  On the second night, 14th/15th March, Forbe’s Column continued north-eastwards into the Pegu Yomas and joined Turner’s Column at Udo, near Chaunggwe, on 15th March.  The combined force now came under the command of Captain Turner as Major Russell was still away.[21]

This force had only one wireless set as the others, including the charging motor, had been taken over by the Army.  There was only one three inch mortar remaining as the other had been lent to the 2nd Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment.[22]

On 15th March, orders for the 1st Burma Division were changed. The Division’s objectives were now to cover the arrival of the 5th Chinese Army in the area Thazi-Toungoo and then to move to Prome, to join the 17th Indian Division as part of the newly formed 1st Burma Corps.[23]  Believing that the 1st Burma Infantry Division was withdrawing on Toungoo, F.F.1 began its own withdrawal northwards on foot.  For several days the force marched North by forced marches, Captain D.E.B. Manning (ABRO)[24] leading them through jungle tracks along streams to avoid the Japanese troops which were now moving between them and the 1st Burma Infantry Division.[25]

By now Major Russell had completed his reconnaissance mission and rejoined Headquarters, 1st Burma Division and on the afternoon of 17th March 1942 was ordered to rejoin F.F.1.  He took with him orders for F.F.1 to move North from Udo on the far West flank of the Division, in the Pegu Yomas, to “cut in” on the route from Toungoo to Prome and to protect the South flank of that route pending its use by other troops. On 18th March, the Division believed that F.F.1 was moving from the Udo area to Mobon in anticipation of a further withdrawal northwards at the F.F.1 commander’s discretion.[26]  In the meantime, F.F.1 had reached the Pyu Chaung where the wireless batteries were running low.  Unable to make contact with the 1st Burma Division the force pressed on, correctly anticipating the Division’s intent.  On 21st March F.F.1 were still out of touch with the division but it was known that F.F.1 was low on supplies and that their wireless batteries were almost exhausted.  The 5th Burma Rifles were ordered to make their way Prome across the Pegu Yomas on foot and were to take F.F.1 under command if encountered (which appears not to have occurred).  Shortly after this date Major Russell found F.F.1 at Satchaung with the vital wireless batteries, the finding of a proverbial "needle in a haystack".[27]  

The force marched on past the Kabaung Post House and down the Kabaung Chaung to Nabumyaung, to the West of Oktwin and Toungoo.  Here one of F.F.1's patrols met the Japanese and was lost.  Later it was heard that all bar one of the men escaped, running through the Japanese lines to join the Chinese.  By this time the force was out of food and the men exhausted by marching and hunger.   Luckily a rice store was found and the march continued westwards to Kyetsha.  F.F.1 was joined by some 200 stragglers from F.F.4 who had been operating in the same area around Myogyaung and some Gurkhas from a Gurkha regiment.  These men were formed into a third column but were in bad shape and it was doubtful if they would have been much use in a fight.  They were also an additional drain on the dwindling food supplies.[28]

Finally, on the morning of 2nd April 1942, F.F.1 sent a message to the Headquarters, 1st Burma Division stating that the Pegu Yomas had been crossed and that the force had reached Paukkaung at midnight, 1st April 1942.  Here the force “collected” a platoon from the 5th Burma Rifles and “one Karen Column of the Kokine Battalion without transport”.[29]

The Mounted Infantry Column, who were last heard of at Taunggyi, had been ordered to proceed to the rail head at Shwenyaung Station and from there by rail to Pyinmana.  From here they crossed to the Prome front by train[30].

Withdrawal from Prome and Allanmyo

Having transferred to the Prome front, the 1st Burma Division took up defensive positions around Allanymo, to Kyaukpadaung to the East and to Dayindabo to the South along the Irrawaddy valley. From Paukkaung, F.F.1 made attempts to link up with the Division but was hampered by the Japanese advance northwards following the withdrawal of the 17th Indian Division from Prome on the night of 30th March.  Finding the route to Prome blocked, the detachment marched North towards Shwebandaw, at the head of a road leading westwards to the main road just South of Allanmyo.[31]

The Mounted Infantry Column, already in the Allanymo area having transferred from the Shan States by train, was attached to the 13th Indian Infantry Brigade.  On 31st March the Column was placed under the command of the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade which was to concentrate in the Dayindabo area.  The Mechanised Column of F.F.1, which had until then been under the command of the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade was also at Dayindabo, was to revert to direct command of the 1st Burma Division (i.e. Divisional troops) upon arrival of the Mounted Infantry in the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade’s area.[32]

The 1st Burma Division's objective now was to protect the withdrawal of the 17th Indian Division by holding the Allanmyo area prior to its own withdrawal to the Yin Chaung line, South of Magwe. On 1st April, the employment of the Mounted Infantry Column of F.F1 and the Divisional carrier Platoon was set out in Operational Instruction No. 17.  The M.I. Column and the Carrier Platoon were to watch the tracks to the South of the Division to provide early reports of any Japanese movement northwards.  One troop of the M.I. was to remain under command of the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade and to watch the tracks to the East of the main road.  The remainder of the M.I. Column, F.F.1, was placed under the command of the 13th Indian Brigade and ordered to watch the tracks to the South of the brigade area around Kyaukpadaung.[33]

The orders for F.F.1 issued on 3rd April were to move into the 1st Burma Division reserve, moving from Shwebandaw via Allanmyo not later than the night of 4th/5th April.  On arrival with the divisional Reserve, F.F.1 was to reabsorb its detached Mounted Infantry and Mechanised Columns.  However, given the abandonment of the Allanmyo-Thayetmyo positions on the night of 5th/6th April, these orders were amended and one column of F.F.1 was now ordered to join up with the Mounted Infantry detachments working with the 13th Indian Brigade and to move to Mogaung via Kyetyongale.   Here F.F.1 would come under the command of the 13th Indian Brigade.  The Mounted Infantry troop and Mechanised Column detached to the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade were to remain with that brigade.[34]

Arriving at Kyaukpadaung on the morning of 4th April, F.F.1 met Captain Kennedy of the Mounted Infantry Column.  Kennedy had only five men under his command, having been attacked at the village of Sindok at around midnight the previous evening.  Kennedy’s command was forced to disperse under Japanese mortar fire and withdrew to Kyaukpadaung.  That evening F.F.1 resumed its march to Mogaung via Sakangyi and Kyetongale with the Mounted Infantry Column and the Divisional carrier platoon under command.  The 1st Burma Division issued new orders that day, instructing the Mounted Infantry Column to join the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade with effect from 6th April.[35]

On the morning of 7th April, the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade was ordered to send the Mounted Infantry with a wireless set to the village of Didokpin where the Mounted Infantry where to come under the command of the 13th Indian Brigade.   The 13th Indian Brigade was ordered to send an infantry detachment to support the Mounted Infantry and one company of the 1st Battalion, 18th Royal Garhwal Rifles was sent.[36]  The Mounted Infantry arrived in Didokpin on the morning of 10th April where they were ambushed by the Japanese, estimated to be two companies in strength.[37]  The survivors fell back northwards on Kanhla and were closely followed up by the Japanese.  By evening they had retired to Thityagauk.[38]  The Mounted Infantry survivors were attached to F.F.1 and after reporting that evening to Brigadier Curtis, commander of the 13th Indian Brigade at Thityagauk, Kennedy was evacuated to a hospital ship on the river where his wound was operated upon.  He saw no further action and joined the general withdrawal to India.  It seems F.F.1 was withdrawn into reserve shortly afterwards.  The detachment's animal transport was taken over by the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade, as part of a wider Divisional plan to make the brigades more mobile when moving off roads.  The men were then sent back to Yenangyaung by lorry, to rest and refit.[39]

Reorganisation and the Battle at Pin Chaung

The higher command had decided to reorganise the F.F.s to break up the big F.Fs and make them into smaller mobile units of two companies each and to create a separate force of Mounted Infantry by amalgamating the surviving mounted elements.[40]  Orders to this effect had been issued on 3rd April.[41]  It was decided to carry out reorganisation at Yenangyaung which had recently become the Advanced Headquarters of the Inspector General of the Burma Frontier Force, having been relocated there from Pyawbwe in February, the Rear Headquarters moving to Myitkyina.  At Yenangyaung the Inspector General, Brigadier Roughton, combined these duties with that of the Commander, Central Area, responsible for maintaining and protecting the lines of communication.[42]  By April Yenangyaung was also home to a draft of B.F.F. reinforcements.  F.F.1., F.F.3., and F.F.4. were concentrated in the scrub along the North of Pin Chaung and reorganisation and re-equipping began around 4th or 5th April 1942.[43]  The original F.F.1 was made into a new F.F.1 of two companies of Gurkhas under Captain L.G. Gaudie,[44] but he went sick almost immediately and Captain D.R. Turner took command.  The Kachin Column joined with that of F.F.4 to form a new F.F.4.  Major Russell was appointed Commander Frontier Force (C.F.F.) to the 1st Burma Infantry Division.  There were insufficient personnel and the resulting newly reorganised infantry columns were somewhat below the planned establishment.  All were re-equipped except for wireless equipment by the morning of 16th April.[45] 

The survivors of the Mounted Infantry column, F.F.1 were amalgamated with the Mounted Infantry Column of F.F.3.  This new Mounted Infantry Column was commanded by Captain G.B. Thunder[46] and reported as being retained by the 1st Burma Infantry Division.[47]  However it also seems that this new Mounted Infantry force may have been split into two squadrons for the Burcorps Operation Instruction of 3rd April gave details of the regrouping of the F.F. columns, with “A” Squadron, M.I. (F.F.1), attached to “Striking Force” (the 1st Burma Infantry Division, the 48th Indian Infantry Brigade and the 7th Armoured Brigade) and “B” Squadron, M.I. (F.F.3), 17th Indian Infantry Division.[48]

Of this reorganisation, Major Russell later wrote:  "This reorganisation from F.F.1s point of view appears to have been a pity. Up till then it had been a whole fighting unit trained to fight together and used to its officers. Its scouting ability had enabled it to hold its own against the Japs. Now new officers were drafted in and it was mixed up with other units under officers and N.C.Os it did not know, while its officers and men did not know their new jobs. Their M.I., mortars and W.T. sets had been removed."[49]

Sometime later, on or just before 16th April, these newly formed units, F.F.1, F.F.3 and F.F.4, moved back to the North of the Pin Chaung where they were camped prior to being sent out as an information screen.  By now the 1st Burma Infantry Division had withdrawn from the Magwe area to Yenangyaung, South of the Pin Chaung.[50]  It was then that a new threat to the 1st Burma Infantry Division had emerged.  What follows is described by Lt. Colonel Pryce:

F.F. Detachments at the Pin Chaung 16/17th April 1942

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“In the evening of 16th April when at _________ (I forget the name of the place but the road goes right to Kyaukpadaung and a left branch goes to Chauk [the village is Gwegyo]), I was ordered to detail two F.Fs. to proceed to the two tracks between the two routes MAGWE – YENANGYAUNG, TAUNGDWINGYI – NATMAUK along which 1 Burdiv and 17 Div respectively were withdrawing.  I proceeded there and gave orders to the Os.C. [Officers Commanding] F.F.1 & F.F.3 (Major D.R. Turner and Major J.H. Turner[51]).  I was about to return to Corps H.Qrs about 2030 hours but stopped to speak to Capt. Forbes. A station wagon passed me proceeding in the direction of the village where the Kyaukpadaung and Chauk roads fork. When it reached a point about 500 yards ahead, just before the rise in the ground, a sudden burst of L.A. [light automatic] fire was heard and the station wagon burst into flames.  F.F. Commanders were called and ordered to arrange local protection while proceeding with their preparations to move as ordered.  Shortly afterwards the driver of the station wagon came in and reported that the fire had come from the East of the road.  Several vehicles from the North then came through unmolested.   About this time 2 Bn. R. Tanks Corps [2nd Royal Tank Regiment] arrived.  The officer commanding was given all information and stated that he proposed to push on, so I ordered F.Fs. 1 & 3 to be prepared to follow the Tanks.  The first tank went up the road and when opposite the burning station wagon, one of its tracks was blown off by a grenade or mine and the road was blocked.  O.C. 2nd Bn. R.T.C. [2nd Royal Tank Regiment] then decided to remain for the night or until the road was clear, sent a tank up near the disabled tank, ordered the crew of the latter to evacuate their tank as soon as covering fire was opened by the 2nd tank.  This was done successfully and the crew were evacuated safely. Shortly afterwards the tank was set alight by the enemy.

I then ordered F.F.4. to sweep the area E of the road and they moved off about 2330 hours. Throughout the night there were a number of bursts of L.A. fire and the noise of crackers etc., but it was obvious that no contact was made.  I therefore decided to put a sweep through on both sides of the road, starting just before dawn. F.F.1. was detailed.  At first no opposition was encountered.  At about dawn heavy fire was heard and F.F.4. was later seen withdrawing on the EAST of the road and suffered considerable casualties.  F.F.1. was then held up on the East of the road but advanced on WEST of the road for a time, when this flank was also held up by fire further to the West.  One Pl. F.F.3. was then despatched to deal with this enemy post and receiving valuable aid from a section of tanks, were able to overcome the opposition and the advance continued.  The right flank was still held up and the tanks were unable to help.  I went to this flank and was able to get a small party of about 1 section forward to within 50 yards of the high ground occupied by the enemy.  About ½ of the section became casualties and further progress was impossible owing to the enfilade fire of a L.A. further to the East.  By this time those on the West of the road had advanced and were about level with the party on the East of the road.  I proceeded over to them, decided to put in an attack on the high ground on the EAST of the road from the West, and went back to arrange for co-operation with the Tanks.  The O.C. Tank Bn., put one tp. at my disposal to support the attack.  One A.A. [anti-aircraft] gun also came into action and engaged the enemy position.  The attack went in and the enemy evacuated the position and withdrew to the East. Having proceeded about 300 yards to the EAST of the road a position was occupied under heavy S.A.A. and Mortar fire.  The Tanks and a good deal of the transport which had been piling up all night went through.  The enemy then infiltrated round our flanks and got back to the road preventing any further movement along the road and also taking us in the rear.  “A” Company of the KOYLI [King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry] who were on the far side of the road block had occupied the highest ground astride the road further to the North and we withdrew on them.  On our departure a flight of about 12 Japanese bombers bombed what transport remained in PINCHAUNG [sic]."[52]

The 1st Burma Infantry Division eventually escaped across the Pin Chaung on the afternoon of 19th April, having had to abandon most of its motor transport.

Monywa and the Final Withdrawal

F.F.1 at Monywa 30th April/1st May 1942 (Indian Official History)

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F.F.4 was almost destroyed and set off North for Myitkyina but never reached there as the men were paid off at Naba on the way.  F.F.1 and F.F.3 had suffered a number of casualties also but being in better shape were then concentrated at the village of Gwegyo, North of the Pin Chaung where the Kyaukpadaung and Chauk roads fork.  From there they were sent to the Mount Popa area.  When news was received that the enemy were advancing in strength on Kyaukpadaung, F.F.1 and F.F.3 were ordered to protect that village.  Later, upon withdrawal from Kyaukpadaung, F.F.3 was placed under the direct command of the 1st Burma Infantry Division and F.F.1 became Corps Troops (under the direct command of the 1st Burma Corps).[53]

The Mounted Infantry under the command of Captain G.B. Thunder, previously the Commanding Officer of F.F.5, were also retained by the 1st Burma Infantry Division.  On 20th April both Major Russell and Captain Thunder were placed in charge of “straggler posts”, ordered to gather in stragglers for subsequent collection by their brigades.  On the 22nd April, the Mounted Infantry were given the role of escorting all of the 1st Burma Infantry Division’s animal transport for the withdrawal to Taungtha.  Later, on 25th April, F.F.3 and the Mounted Infantry Column were placed under command of the 13th Indian Brigade, in the Myingyan area, and charged with watching the Division’s West flank.   The Division was at this time holding a position in the area of Taungtha, covering the withdrawal of the 1st Burma Corps, prior to its own withdrawal to the East bank of the Chindwin.  At the end of April, the 63rd Indian Brigade of the 17th Indian Infantry Division, located at Chaung-U, was placed under the command of the 1st Burma Infantry Division, with effect from 1st May.  The Mounted Infantry were sent to Chaung-U to come under the command of the 63rd Indian Brigade on arrival.[54]

Moving with the Headquarters of the 1st Burma Corps, F.F.1 under the command of Major Turner arrived at Songon, 16 miles to the North of Monywa on 30th April.  Monywa was held by a detachment of the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment and the river patrol of Royal Marines known as Force “Viper”.  That evening this small garrison came under heavy fire from across the Chindwin River.  That night F.F.1 was sent by Burcorps to bolster the Monywa garrison.  The next morning however, under the cover of heavy fire and intense air activity, the Japanese successfully crossed the river and secured a foothold in Monywa.  Being no more than 250 strong and with no heavy weapons, the combined garrison was forced to withdraw to high ground about two miles North of the town.[55]  During action at Monywa, Subedar Baghandoj Raj was blinded but continued to command his company, being led round by the hand.  Unfortunately the recommendation for an award for this act of gallantry was submitted too late for approval.[56]

F.F.1 and F.F.7 at Budalin 2nd/4th May 1942 (1st Glosters War Diary WO 172/861)

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The detachment of Gloucesters and F.F.1 withdrew again and by 2nd May were in the area North of Alon on the Monywa-Yeu road.  That evening, the remainder of the Gloucesters arrived, with an F.F.7 column under command and together with some mountain artillery and a few anti-tank guns were formed into a composite force under the command of the Gloucesters’ Commanding Officer, Lt. Colonel Bagot, known as “Bagot” Force.[57]  This force was directed to delay the Japanese for as long as possible whilst the 1st Burma Infantry Division completed its withdrawal from Monywa.  The force took up positions around Budalin astride the road and railway to Yeu.  F.F.1 were at the rear of the position, with orders to patrol to the West and North out to about eight miles.  F.F.7 were placed on the right flank with orders to patrol out to three miles.  On the evening of 3rd May tanks of the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment withdrew on to the Budalin position and harboured behind the forward troops of “Bagot” Force.  In the early hours of 4th May, the Commanding Officer of F.F.7 reported enemy movement on his front and that he had withdrawn his column to Budalin.  Here he was ordered to hold a gap between two of the Gloucesters’ companies.  Before dawn a small force of Japanese supported by three tanks attempted to dislodge the force.  However they were beaten off and at 06:30 orders were received for “Bagot” Force to withdraw to Yeu.  A section of mountain guns and F.F.1 provided rearguard cover.  Following the successful withdrawal of the force, F.F.1 were ordered to rejoin Frontier Force Headquarters.  Presumably F.F.7 joined them for both columns joined the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade on 6th May, the brigade being give the role of flank guard to the 1st Burma Corps.[58]  The final march to India was completed from Pyu Gaing through Pantha to Tamu.[59]

F.F.1 and F.F.7 at Budalin 2nd/4th May 1942 (1st Glosters War Diary WO 172/861)

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After arrival with the Brigade in India, on 28th May the F.F.1 and F.F.7 columns left the Brigade for the Burma Frontier Force Camp at milestone 107 on the Tamu-Manipur road where they were disbanded, with the officers and men entering the pool of Burma Frontier Force and Burma Military Police.[60]

22 November 2017