6th Burma Rifles, Tavoy, January 1942 – Andrews Narrative
Note: The account which follows is transcribed from a letter received by Lt. Colonel E.C.V. Foucar, the official historian of the 1942 Burma campaign. It was written by Captain W.R. Andrews who was a company commander with the 6th Battalion, Burma Rifles during the action at Tavoy. The narrative provided by Captain Andrews formed the basis of the account of the loss of Tavoy that appeared in the Indian Official History, “Indian Armed Forces in World War II, The Retreat from Burma, 1941-42”, Prasad Bishewar (ed), Orient Longmans, 1959. The Indian Official History drew heavily upon the history written by Lt. Colonel Foucar, which he began preparing from late 1942 in his office at Simla, the headquarters of the Burma Government in exile in India. Lt. Colonel Foucar collected all surviving documents, such as war diaries, and wrote to many officers who served in the 1942 campaign, asking them to contribute what they knew.
Captain Andrews’ narrative is found in one of Foucar’s files held at The National Archives at Kew, near London, WO 203/5691.
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Personal Narrative File
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6 Buregt.,
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Dear Col Foucar,
I am sorry that I have not replied to your two letters before this. I was not actually in Tavoy when it fell, but shall be pleased to tell you the part I know of the story as I saw it along the road some 20 miles east of Tavoy.
On 13th Jan 42, I was at KALEINAUNG handing over to 4/12 FFR [the 4th Battalion, 12th Frontier Force Regiment] when the following message was received:
“Police report 300 Japs occupied SINBYUDAING. Information is being investigated but D.S.P. [District Superintendent] states it reliable. Get ‘A’ Coy back to Tavoy as quickly as possible together with mainpost. Ack. [acknowledge]”
The Coy was back that evening & handed over to Capt Booker [Butcher?] who was to command them. I took my own Coy., ‘C’, out to MYITTA with orders to delay & obtain inf[ormation] of the reported Jap force. There must also have been some order about dispositions, because our positions when the Japs did attack were NOT those I would have chosen myself.
On 14 Jan 42. our posns [positions] were:
Communication between TAVOY and KYAUKMEDAUNG was by Bus or Telephone, between KYAUKMEDAUNG & SEINPYON by Cycle & between KYAUKMEDAUNG & MYITTA by Bus.
The Pl [platoon] at SEINPYON was to watch a track which came in from the [something] near there (A small recce patrol could probably have done this). The Pl at MYITTA prepared a defensive posn east of MYITTA on the river junction & also sent patrols along the track heading east to a distance of about 8 miles. The reserve Pl was in KYAUKMEDAUNG.
On 14 Jan 42. a message was received from Bn HQ in TAVOY [Battalion Headquarters]:
“Now learn Japs were at SINBYUDAING 8 Jan 42 and were preparing track along southern bank TENASSERIM River towards MYITTA. Numbers stated to be 200 to 300 maybe more. Arranged with D.S.P. have send patrol [of] villagers down track towards SINBYUDAUNG. You should also patrol this approach to discover how far Japs have progressed. Keep in close touch with Police. You can use old Police post MYITTA if required. Ack. [acknowledge]”
A Jap recce plane was over both KYAUKMEDAUNG & MYITTA on 13,, 14 & 15 Jan 42. On 15 Jan 42 I went with the patrol along the south bank of the Tenasserim River to a distance of about 6 miles. We were looking for a possible place to ambush the enemy. On 15 Jan 42 at about 1630 hrs the Adjt [Adjutant] 6 Burif visited Kyaukmedaung with a Lt. Col of the Engineers (I forget his name). We were on our way to inspect MYITTA when we met an orderly with a message to say that the Japs were on the opposite bank of the Ban Chaung. I went with the orderly to the Myitta posn, while the Adjt returned to KYAUKMEDAUNG to:
1. Inform TAVOY
2. Send the Reserve Pl to MYITTA.
Our reserve came up & was rapidly put into position, it was actually the pl which saw most of the fighting.
The Japs attacked soon after 17:00 hrs, but were fired on as their leading section crossed the river, they took cover on their own bank. From reports of forward secs. [sections] I estimate about 20 must have been hit but from my posn could not see this. One of the police patrol sent out then came up & reported that there were a large number of Japs south east of our position.
I sent this information back to H.Q. & also suggested that if another Coy could come up on our right flank we could hold up the crossing more effectively. The posn was something like this:
When the second crossing was attempted it was not as far down as I had expected, but was undertaken under cover of mortar fire onto MYITTA posns. & when the light was failing. Meantime orders had come from Bn HQ to recce area for other Coy which was being sent but that if this could not be done before dark, or before the posn was attacked, to fall back on Kyaukmedaung & take up a posn on the hills. By 18:45 the Japs had a number of men actually across the river & my Coy withdrew at 19:00 hrs. There was only one casualty. It was difficult to estimate the number of enemy trying to cross the river, at the time I thought there were about 200. But now knowing something of Jap methods of making a lot of noise, both by shouting & firing, which is intended to give this very impression, I consider there were probably not so many.
The night of 15/16 Jan 42. C. Coy (my Coy) & A. Coy who had just come out took up a posn. astride road near 25 mile stone on the TAVOY/KYUAKMEDAUNG Rd.
On the morning of 16 Jan 42 we advanced on KYAUKMEDAUNG. There were no Japs in the town, but they were reported to be in MYITTA with outposts near the 32 milestone.
The two Coys remained in KYAUKMEDAUNG all day, but enemy movements were reported south of KYAUKMEDAUNG about 23:00 hrs. So we withdrew back to our old posn at 25 Milestone on the hills.
17 Jan 42. it was decided to remain in present posn. till arrival of one Coy from 3 Burif [3rd Battalion, Burma Rifles]. ‘A’ Coy remained on road. ‘C’ Coy was sent to cover Rt. [right] flank from the vicinity of YEBU TAUNG [Yay Pu Taung?].
Signal communication was maintained & that afternoon one Coy from 3 Burif arrived.
About 20:00 hrs I received orders thro [through] Captain Williams who had come out to do det [detachment] Adjt [Adjutant], that I was to withdraw onto the road near Wagon & report to Det HQ [Detachment Headquarters] at 08:00 next morning. The intention I gathered was to attack KYAUKMEDAUNG.
About 23:00 hrs a large fire was seen in KYAUKMEDAUNG & shortly afterwards the Japs attacked the 25 mile posn. I heard all this from YEBU TAUNG but as the arranged signal for my withdrawal was NOT fired stayed where I was. I cannot vouch for this but I understand the attack was in 2 parts. The main attack came straight down the road while a small force came over the hills north of the road & attacked from the rear, their first objective being Det HQ. Captain Chiodetti [3rd Burma Rifles] was killed. Captain Ley [Captain H.E. Le, 3rd Burma Rifles] was wounded. 3 Burif Coy had most of the fighting, only one pl of ‘A’ Coy being really involved.
The battle stopped in the early hours of the morning & at 06:30 hrs I started to withdraw ‘C’ Coy thus:
Routes back had been recced but not withstanding this 1 Pl and Coy HQ [Company Headquarters] lost the track & were half an hour late in getting to the road. By this time the other 2 Pls had reached WAGON & bumped into the Jap rearguard. When ‘C’ Coy HQ & third Pl arrived only the Sub [Subedar] & his orderly could be found. We spent about two hours looking for these Pls but could not find them. On one small hillock north of the road there was a Bren gunner, his Sec Comd [Section Commander] & No.2, all dead, but no other troops (I learned later that they had all moved up north of the road where, in the jungle they had met a Karen who led them to Hameingyi [Hermyingyi] Mine where were also some of the 2 forward Coys from mile 25.
Having given up the search in vain Williams & I went up to a mine bungalow & phoned through to TAVOY. Our instructions were to take what men we had to HAMEINGYI Mine where we would be collected & taken back to reinforce TAVOY.
Night of 18 Jan 42. we started out for HAMEINGYI [Hermyingyi] where there were about 100 Burifs. It is interesting to note that two of the Pls from ‘A’ Coy who were SOUTH of the road (probably 100/200 yds) were in position till 11:00 hrs on 18 Jan. & only withdrew when they discovered that everyone else had left 25 milestone.
The rest is a tale of trekking thro jungle after air attack [or something?] which was all too common in Burma & which I will not retell.
This is an absurdly long account of what must be one of the more unimportant battles of the war but given the chance we are all inclined to talk about our own particular share in those operations.
If any of this is of use to you I am only too pleased to have been of service. I would suggest that Capt. Watts, M.C. of 3 Buregt [3rd Battalion, The Burma Regiment] could probably tell you of the full story of TAVOY.
Yours sincerely,
[signed] W.R. Andrews
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[11 December 2017]