[Transcribed from National Archives File WO 203/5693 by:  Steve Rothwell - The Burma Campaign web site.]

 

Burma Frontier Force

Report of [the] Burma Military Police

By Major H. Chappell[1]

Period 1941 Dec – 1942 May

 

With the outbreak of War with Japan on 7/12/1941, the duties and responsibilities of the two Rangoon Battalions of the Burma Military Police stationed in Rangoon greatly increased.  In Rangoon guards had to be provided over Japanese premises, vulnerable points in the City and Suburbs had to be guarded, the Bns had their part to play, in conjunction with the Civil Police, in Passive Air Raid defence measures, arrangements for active air defence were made in the Bns’ Lines and, finally, the Bns, were required to take part in an anti-parachutist scheme should this become necessary.  Advanced tactical training, which had commenced under Army Supervision, had to stop.

On 23/12/41, The men at Rangoon Headquarters had their first experience of an air raid and opened fire on the enemy planes with L.M.Gs. and Rifles.  An Air-Battle overhead provided a spectacle which will long be remembered.  Although no Bombs fell in the B.M.P. Lines, casualties occurred among the civilian population in the city.  A similar raid followed on 25/12/41.  The B.M.P. Lines escaped again, but damage and casualties were sustained in the city.  In these two Raids over one thousand Civilians were killed.

Subsequently, particularly during periods of the waning moon, air raids at night were frequent, but the enemy planes did not drop bombs on Rangoon City.  Their efforts were concentrated on the Mingaladon Aerodrome – nevertheless on all air raid warnings, the men had to leave their barracks and occupy their ARP trenches in the lines and at posts in the City.  As many as four times in a night Officers and men sometimes had to turn out.  This produced an ever increasing strain upon them.  By day also, work was interfered with long periods having to be spent in the A.R.P. trenches.

Two platoons of  the 2nd Bn, The B.M.P. were detailed for Column duty at THONGWA in the Hanthawaddy district and came under the command of Captain LINDSAY, an asst. comdt. of the Mdly. Bn. B.M.P.[2]  These platoons, eventually, were evacuated by sea to INDIA after the demolitions at Syriam had been completed.[3]

In view of the probability of the B.M.P. having to leave Rangoon, and to prevent the interruption in training of recruits, due to Air Raids and air raid warnings, the training companies of both Rangoon Battalions under the command of Major T.H. GEAKE, 1st Rangoon Bn. B.M.P. moved out of Rangoon to Mdly [Mandalay] and thence eventually to BHAMO.[4]

The Civil evacuation of Rangoon was now proceeding rapidly.  Very heavy strain was thrown on both B.M.P. Bns. owing to the extra duties this involved.  Large Escorts for prisoners and treasure had to be provided.

The heavy kit of the 2nd Rangoon Bn., Office records, mens’ kit boxes, etc. were now packed up ready to be moved to Mandalay in case it became necessary for the B.M.P. to leave Rangoon.  Only a small part of this baggage was ever removed from Rangoon (that left behind was looted) as at about 1300 hours on 20/2/42, the two Bns. received orders to move by march route to THARRAWADDY.  They left the same day at 1700 hours under the command of Major (Later A/Lt-Col [acting Lt. Colonel]) J.E.L. MARTIN, I.A., Bn Comdt. 1st Rangoon Bn, B.M.P. the senior Bn. Comdt. of the two Bns.[5]  A small number of Civil Transportation Department lorries was obtained and so only the minimum of kit could be taken.

Some 200 Men taken from both Bns. under the command of Major M.D. HINDLE were left in Rangoon to provide essential guards and duties.[6]

During the course of the withdrawal from Rangoon to MYITKYINA, various parties of B.M.P. from out posts [sic] and returning prisoner and treasure escorts arrived, thus the strength of the B.M.P. fluctuated from day to day.

At the time of marching out from Rangoon about one hundred men of the 2nd Rangoon Bn., B.M.P. were deficient of water bottles, mess tins, and necessary items of clothing as the Superintendent of Police Supplies could not obtain them.  This shortage of water bottles made the maintenance of strict march discipline a matter of considerable difficulty, especially when villages with a water supply near the road were reached.  It is also a point for record that the B.M.P. were not equipped for war against a modern enemy.  They had for instance no water pakhals, no signalling equipment, no field dressings and, except for four Lewis Guns in each Bn., of which only five were available in Rangoon, they had no automatic weapons or grenades.[7]  Their organisation for tactical purposes was on a platoon basis – each platoon consisting of 1 G.C.O. or Havildar and 25 Other Ranks, except in Rangoon, where the platoon consisted of 1 G.C.O. or Havildar and 19 Other Ranks.

During the march to THARRAWADDY a party of 18 Men from both Bns. who had sore feet, and who were travelling in a lorry, met disaster when the lorry left the road near OKKAN.  Two were killed and the others injured.  It was also during this march that information was received that the B.M.P. had come under the control of the army.  On arrival at THARRAWADDY the men of the 1st Rangoon Bn., B.M.P. were accommodated at the B.M.P. Post, while those of the 2nd Rangoon Bn. B.M.P. in the Karen High School.

Following the departure of the B.M.P. from Rangoon the situation in the city got out of hand.  There was much looting and incendiarism.  The men under Major M.D. HINDLE already had tasks allotted to them, so could not deal with the situation.  In view of this, orders were received for the return of 500 B.M.P. to Rangoon to restore law and order.  200 men of the 1st Rangoon Bn. and 300 men of the 2nd Rangoon Bn. were detailed for this, and returned to Rangoon in an empty Army M.T. [motor transport] convoy on 25/2/42 under the command of Major H. CHAPPELL, Bn. Comdt., 2nd Rangoon Bn., B.M.P.  To this 500, the 200 men under the command of Major M.D. HINDLE previously mentioned were added.  Lieut S.DUN also returned to Rangoon and Major A. SMITH, whose duties as Staff Officer, B.M.P. had terminated, also became available.[8] [9]  It was from this juncture that Officers and Men of the two Bns. were mixed and remained so.

To deal with the looting and incendiarism, the B.M.P. were located in the various Police Stations in the City and operated there from the orders of Police Officers who had been given Army rank.  As Police Station areas were cleared of looters, the B.M.P. were moved further out to the outskirts of the city.  Law and order were restored.  At least one hundred individuals surprised in the act of looting or incendiarism were shot during these operations.

The B.M.P. had no transport of their own, and as M.T. was not available, it was decided that on the final day of the evacuation from Rangoon, on receiving the order, the B.M.P. would move on foot carrying their kits, cooking pots and rations to KEMMENDINE Railway Station and entrain on the last train leaving that station.  On the morning of 7/3/42 however, the day of the final evacuation of Rangoon, some forty C.T.D. lorries sufficient to move all the B.M.P. from Rangoon became available, as the personnel previously allotted to them were proceeding by sea to INDIA.  These lorries accordingly, were sent to Police Stations and Bn. H.Q. at the scale of one lorry per platoon, plus lorries for essential stores and office records, which had been possible to retrieve from the scattered contents of boxes which had been looted in the B.M.P. Lines and Bn. Offices.

It may be noted here that the scope of devastation in the 2nd Rangoon Bn. Lines on the return of the B.M.P. to Rangoon on 25/2/42 was almost unbelievable.  Boxes containing stores had been broken open and the contents scattered everywhere, band instruments smashed to pieces, office records strewn all over the office, ink thrown everywhere, the Quartermaster’s stores and coffee shop ransacked, doors in the buildings which had been closed smashed open, and men’s kit boxes which had been neatly stacked in the barracks broken open and the contents strewn about all over the Lines.  On the withdrawal signal, all the B.M.P. returned from Police Stations by lorry to the B.M.P. Lines and together with Bn. H.Q. personnel and Civil Police moved out in convoy with orders to proceed to PROME.  The O.C., B.M.P. after seeing the last lorry out of the B.M.P. Lines made his way up the lorry column by car, but later at INSEIN finding a lorry missing went back for it.  This lorry which had taken a wrong turning was eventually found.  With four other lorries which had waited on the road the O.C., B.M.P. moved on to TAUKKYAN where it was expected to find that the remainder of the lorries had gone on to PROME.  Such, however, was not the case as the enemy had blocked the road, fighting was in progress and this continued all night.

Lieut S. DUN was sent back to MINGALADON to look for the missing lorries.  Before nightfall, some fifteen lorries containing approximately 270 men had arrived, but the remainder had returned to RANGOON after Major A. SMITH who was with them had been told at MINGALADON that the road was blocked and that he should catch the last train from KEMMENDINE.

On the morning of the 8/3/42, the B.M.P. at TAUKKYAN were placed by A.H.Q. under the command of the O.C. 1 Glosters.  An attack by a Brigade and Tanks was made on the enemy and the road block was successfully removed – the enemy, however, had passed a large force across the road during the night and this had gone on to Rangoon.  The B.M.P. at TAUKKYAN were then able to continue their journey to THARRAWADDY where the halted.  Lieut. S. DUN returned early the next morning with 100 men at OKKAN.  Major H. CHAPPELL with Major A. SMITH proceeded to PROME on 9/3/42.  370 men also moved to PROME by rail and M.T. and were accommodated in the B.M.P. and Civil Police Lines.

It is not clear whether all the remainder of the B.M.P. which did not continue the journey by lorry to THARRAWADDY did, in fact entrain at KEMMENDINE for the platoons commanded by Subedar SAW PAN KYAING who was officiating as Subedar Major of the 2nd Rangoon Bn. (Subedar Major RAHIN DAD KHIN, 1st Rangoon Bn. B.M.P. performed the duties of Subedar Major of Major H. CHAPPELL’s party throughout) Jemadar MAITHANG LIMBU and Jemadar HASTABAHADUR LIMBU were never accounted for again.  It is possible that they fell into the hands of the enemy.

The train by which the remainder of the B.M.P. under Major A. SMITH travelled from KEMMENDINE met with disaster about 2200 hours on 7/3/42 near WANETCHAUNG.  A pilot engine preceding it fell through a bridge and the engine of the train did likewise.  As the enemy directed heavy fire on the train when this happened it is presumed that this caused the accident.  From accounts received the B.M.P. put up a spirited reply and soon silenced the enemy fire.  In this connection it was reported that Havildar Major LALL KHAN of the 1st Rangoon Bn B.M.P. who was killed was seen lying dead with his rifle in his shoulder and six dead Japanese lying nearby.  Most of the B.M.P., after detraining, having abandoned their kits in the train, but retaining their arms, ammunition and equipment, made their way to the main road to PROME where, fortunately they found friendly transport which took them to THARRAWADDY.  Others took to the jungle and joined up several days later.  The exact casualties which occurred in this affair are not known.  Most of the survivors eventually were sent to PROME to join Major H. CHAPPELL’s party which totalled some 600 men.  This remained with Lt.-Col J.E.L. MARTIN at THARRAWADDY [Prome?].  Those who arrived at PROME were fitted out, with considerable difficulty, with boots putties, and other necessary articles which could be obtained from the Field Ordnance Depot at PROME.  The first duty of the B.M.P. at PROME was the prevention of looting in the town.  Strong patrols were sent out continuously day and night and guards were posted at various points in the town.  Looting soon ceased.  The Policing of the Military transit area was another duty the B.M.P. had to perform.  Escorts for prisoners treasure and arms also were provided.  A platoon of Karens which was escorting prisoners from PROME jail to MYINGYAN by launch suffered casualties when the launch was sunk by enemy aerial bombing.  Some 14 men of this platoon were unaccounted for.

Major A. SMITH, the only B.O. with Major CHAPPELL at PROME, left soon after his arrival, under Lt-Col MARTIN’s orders, to take command of a column near THARRWADDY.  Brigadier F.A.G. ROUGHTON, I.A., Inspector General, Frontier Force and Commander Central Sub-Area visited PROME a few days later, and realizing how difficult it was for a single B.O. to supervise all the work required of the B.M.P. at PROME, sent Captain KAVANAGH to assist.[10] [11]

While the B.M.P. were at PROME there were two enemy bombing raids on the town in which two men of the B.M.P. were wounded.  In the first, the bombs were dropped accurately in the transit area.  A platoon of B.M.P., on this occasion, had a narrow escape when a bomb which dropped on a raised road completely shattered the upper storey of a building, 30 yards away, which they had vacated for the ground floor two minutes earlier.  The second raid resulted in the whole town being set ablaze.  One of the bombs set a building on fire and fanned by a strong wind the fire was carried right through the town.  By shutting all doors and windows in the B.M.P.  and Civil Police Lines, and putting out fires as they broke out, the men’s accommodation was saved.  This was only accomplished by the very gallant efforts of a small body of men who carried water and beat out flames in almost intolerable heat, dense smoke and fumes,.  Sepoy BARKAT ALI of the 1st Rgn Bn. B.M.P. must be mentioned for climbing a tree to a height of some 30 feet from the ground and dealing with a fire which had started in the bole of a tree, and from which sparks and burning embers were falling on to the roof of one of the barracks.  The whole time he was there he was in danger of being overcome by fumes and crashing to the ground.  The fire interfered with the water supply to the lines – after this, water had to be brought by lorry from the other end of town.

The O.C. troops at that time at PROME – Lt-Col. COX (subsequently killed by an enemy fighter plane while travelling in a jeep) of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers now required the B.M.P. to assist in the defence of PROME.  4 platoons under Subedar MOTI RAM THAPA 2nd Bn. Rangoon B.M.P. (subsequently killed in a railway accident) came under the orders of Captain WALSH, one of the company commanders of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, and occupied platoon posts on the heights on the West bank of the IRRAWADDY River immediately opposite PROME Town.  4 platoons under Subedar RATTAN SING [sic], proceeded with Lt. SIMPLE of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers to PADAUNG on the West bank of the river some 8 miles downstream from PROME.  1 platoon under Jem. BISI RAM, 1st Rangoon Bn. B.M.P., proceeded with 2/Lt MONTEITH of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers to TOMBO [Tonbo] on the West bank of the river.  The rationing of these detachments presented some difficulty as there were no Govt Launches or Boats to take rations across the river.  This difficulty was eventually overcome as the Deputy Commissioner, PROME, hired country boats for the purpose.

The men under Lt SIMPLE formed platoon posts on the PADAUNG-TAUNGUP road and were involved in fighting in which the Gurkha platoon under Jem. GANDE RAI, 1st Rangoon Bn, B.M.P. was specially mentioned by Lt SIMPLE as having done well.  The platoon of Havildar PASANG CHHIRING LAMA, 2nd Rangoon Bn., B.M.P., one of those with Lt. SIMPLE, 2/Lt. MONTEITH and the platoon with him failed to get away at the time of the withdrawal and nothing has been heard of them since, but they may have made their way to ARRAKAN up the refugee road from PADAUNG to TAUNGUP.

On 31/3/42, Subedar MOTI RAM THAPA reported the enemy moving on the West of his position towards the north, but they made no attempt to engage his men who were in position on the heights.  These platoons, subsequently, were withdrawn without loss under the orders of H.Q. 63rd Brigade which had taken over responsibility for the defence of PROME.  The day following the withdrawal of these platoons the enemy came down to the foreshore on the West Bank of the river and opened fire with a field gun on a launch which was proceeding upstream.  Their shooting was fairly accurate some near misses were registered.  The enemy gun was soon put out of action, by our artillery on the East bank.

On 1/4/42, The B.M.P. were detailed to furnish 200 men – 4 Posts each of two platoons – three posts on the foreshore on the East bank of the river to prevent the enemy crossing the river and one post in reserve at Brigade H.Q., B.M.P. H.Q. and the remainder of the B.M.P., less guards on ration dumps, etc. in the town were located in the B.M.P. and Civil Police Lines around which trenches had been dug.  There were, approximately, including B.M.P., H.Q., some 200 men in  the lines.

Lt-Col. J.E.L. MARTIN, who had passed through PROME two days earlier, had been asked to take over these duties, but owing to some of his detachments not having returned was unable to do so.  He, however, left Captains SILBEY [Sibley] and EDWARDS to assist.[12] [13]  Captain KAVANAGH had already left PROME for ALLANMYO some days previously with 120 men, including unessential details, as part of the move of Major CHAPPELL’s party which it had been decided to withdraw to ALLANMYO.  These men with Captain KAVANAGH, it is understood, were moved under the orders of the Brigade area in which they were located across the river to THAYETMYO.  Office records and Stores at PROME had been sent previously to Frontier Force H.Q. at YENANGYAUNG for safe keeping and were stored at the NYAUNGHLA Stud Farm.

At about 2000 hours on 1/4/42, the enemy commenced their attack on PROME from the South.  At 2130 hours, Captain SIBLEY conducted six lorries with kits to the Brigade rendezvous for M.T. transport, which was moving out with heavy kit from PROME, and returned to the lines.

There was now heavy firing to the South of PROME.  Later, fire was opened on the B.M.P. Lines from the East and enemy seen moving in the moonlight were vigorously engaged.  There was heavy machine gun fire from positions held by a Sikh Bn. to the East and South of the B.M.P. Lines.  These positions were defilated [sic] from fire from the B.M.P. Lines by a bund.  Later, fire was opened on the B.M.P. Lines from the North and this was replied to.  Firing then broke out on the foreshore West of the B.M.P. Lines, but no report was received from the platoons in position there.  Later, shells passed over the B.M.P. Lines from the North East and appeared to burst in proximity to the Brigade H.Q. and others on the foreshore West of the B.M.P. Lines.  None fell on the B.M.P. Lines.  As the situation was obscure, a patrol was sent to the Sikh Bn’s positions on the East to ask for information.  The patrol returned and reported that the Sikh positions had been vacated.  Later, transport and troops passed along the road near the foreshore West of the B.M.P. Lines towards the North, and this movement was not interfered by the B.M.P. platoons stationed in the locality it was presumed that both troops and transport were our own.

At dawn, the O.C., B.M.P. with Captains SIBLEY and EDWARDS took out a reconnoitring patrol.  It was discovered that transport to the West of the B.M.P. Lines was in the hands of the enemy.  Besides consisting of mules and bullock carts there were C.T.D. Lorries and British M.T. trucks.  The enemy called out to the patrol to go away, but to send them the British Officers.  On hearing this, and having obtained the information he required, the O.C., B.M.P. ordered the return of the patrol to the B.M.P. Lines, and realising that the enemy was on the South, West and North gave orders for the withdrawal to the East of the Lines across a bund and into the jungle.

The enemy failed to close this exit and the movement was carried out without interference by him.  A course to the north and one which was judged to be parallel to the PROME-ALLANMYO road was followed.  With the aid of a villager as guide, and after three hours marching, contact with our troops was again made.  An immediate report was then made to 17th Division H.Q. regarding enemy movements along the East Bank of the river to the North of PROME.[14]  Four casualties only (1 P.M. and 3 Kumaonis) were sustained in PROME in this action by the B.M.P. H.Q. party.

It appears that the 63 Brigade withdrew at 2230 hours, but the orders for B.M.P. H.Q. failed to be delivered. Of the remainder of the B.M.P. in PROME, except the two platoons on the foreshore at the north end of the town, the remainder withdrew with the Brigade.  This included guards which joined in with the withdrawal.  The two platoons on the foreshore on the North of the town had, it seems, been driven out of their positions by superior forces.  Subedar RATTAN SING was bayoneted and left for dead – five other men were missing from these platoons.  The remainder fought their way to the North of PROME and eventually joined up again.  Major CHAPPELL’s party then received orders to join up with Lt. Col. MARTIN’s force and together proceeded to ALLANMYO.  For four days all the men of the two Rangoon Bns. remained together and moved on towards TAUNGDWINGYI.  At a camp near TAUNGDWINGYI it was decided that Lt. Col. MARTIN would retain a Coy. of Gurkhas, a Coy of Kumaonis and a H.Q. of 50 – a total of 250 men and that the remainder would move back to MYITKYINA to re-equip.  This remainder moved off under the command of Major H. CHAPPELL who also had Major M.D. HINDLE and Major A. SMITH with him.

At TAUNGDWINGYI, Lt. Col. GG PRYCE, Commander Corps Frontier Force, ordered one platoon of Major CHAPPELL’s party to proceed to MIGYAUNGYE to give confidence to certain personnel of the Post and Telegraph Department who were stationed there.[15] [16]  A Karen platoon was sent and rejoined later after the withdrawal from MIGYAUNGYE had taken place.  There were also 18 men with bullock carts who were directed by Lt.-Col PRYCE to halt with their carts at THADODAN and for whom he accepted responsibility, the intention being to hand them over to the Army.[17]

By leap frogging M.T. transport, MAGWE was eventually reached where an officer of B.F.F. H.Q. had arrived to say that four Frontier Force lorries would arrive next morning to assist in getting the men to YENANGYAUNG.  Next day, the B.M.P. moved to YENANGYAUNG and halted in the Pin Chaung for two days.[18]  From here they moved to MEIKTILA where they stayed for a week.  At MEIKTILA 100 men were employed daily loading railway wagons at the Ordnance Depot while 200 men were used for guarding the two aerodromes.  Enemy bombers visitied MEIKTILA daily.  The B.M.P. had one man wounded, who subsequently died of wounds, and two others wounded in these raids.  Enemy fighter planes also flew low over one of the aerodromes nearly every afternoon and the pilots amused themselves by firing at empty petrol drums around the edge of the aerodrome.  Their shooting was accurate.

To make arrangements to move the B.M.P. by rail to MYITKYINA, Major CHAPPELL received orders from Central Sub-Area H.Q. to visit MANDALAY to consult Movement Control H.Q. there.  This also necessitated a visit to the R.T.O. [Railway Transport Officer] at THAZI.  Arrangements were made eventually to attach wagons for the B.M.P. to an Ordnance special train which was proceeding to KATHA – the balance that could not be given accommodation in the train were to move by B.M.P. M.T.

Before any move from MEIKTILA could take place a platoon had to be sent to THAZI to procure rails with which to mend the line which had been damaged in an air raid.  The rails were obtained and the men helped the R.T.O. MEIKTILA to fix them.  The following day when the B.M.P. arrived at MEIKTILA station to entrain, looting of railway wagons was proceeding.  A Karen platoon fired on the looters shooting three of them.  The B.M.P. entrained but after consultation with the C.O. Ordnance Depot and the R.T.O., MEIKTILA, it was decided to return to barracks and make a start the next evening as a lot of shunting had yet to be carried out in the Ordnance depot.  This would have delayed the train so much that it could not have reached a point far on the main line beyond THAZI before dawn, and so the risk of bombing and machine gunning from the air would have been increased.

The next evening, the special train moved out and those moving with it with Major M.D. HINDLE reached MYITKYINA after various delays. The remainder of the B.M.P. (90 men) which could not be provided with accommodation in the train moved with the O.C. B.M.P. by M.T. (7 lorries and 1 R.E.T. bus) to MANDALAY and the next day to SAGAING, where the office records and stores had been sent previously.  Arrangements were made for the men to entrain at YWATAUNG on 17.4.42  Besides wagons for the men, three wagons for office records, stores and clothing to refit the B.M.P., which had been obtained from the B.C., Mandalay [Battalion Commandant, Mandalay Battalion, Burma Military Police], were procured and after entraining, the lorries and R.E.T. bus were sent to the B.C. Mandalay Bn. B.M.P., at MANDALAY, the drivers following later by train to MYITKYINA.  The train from YWATAUNG unfortunately was derailed near KINU, north of SHWEBO, about 1000 hours on 18.4.42.  The track had been tampered with – fish plates and bolts removed.  This resulted in the engine and 19 wagons and coaches being derailed.  Had the fish plates been removed on the near instead of the far side of the bridge a much more serious accident would have occurred as most of the train would have fallen into the chaung below the bridge.  Besides civilian casualties, Subedar MOTI RAM THAPA, 2nd Rangoon Bn. B.M.P., was killed and five other ranks were injured.  Most of the wagons which were derailed were badly smashed and twisted.  It was with great difficulty that they could be opened and entered.  In this connection, Havildar GANGA RAM, 2nd Rangoon Bn B.M.P., did excellent work in extracting stores, records and clothing from the wagons throughout the day.  Had this N.C.O. not put in the excellent work which he did many stores would have had to be abandoned.  The iron sheeting of the wagons was so hot, and the heat inside so intense, that it was almost impossible for this work to be carried out.  By nightfall, all stores had been transferred to their relief train which had come out from SHWEBO.  The B.M.P. entrained in this and returned to SHWEBO where they halted for three days until other arrangements could be made to send them to MYITKYINA.  They eventually arrived at MYITKYINA on 24-4-42.

The total marching strength of the B.M.P. at MYITKYINA was:-

        3 B.Os., 728 G.C.Os and other ranks, 9 clerks, 5 armourers, 2 mochis, 1 bhisti and 20          sweepers.  The figure of 728 was made up as follows:-

        184 P.Ms.  194 Kumaonis, 198 Gurkhas, 139 Karens, 12 Burmans, 1 Sikh.

Soon after arrival at MYITKYINA, 1 platoon of P.Ms. was sent to SHWEBO, 2 platoons of Kumaonis to KATHA, and 1 platoon of Kumaonis to WUNTHO.  The remainder of the B.M.P. were employed in the construction of a camp for A.H.Q., the clearing of a site for a new aerodrome and guarding the existing aerodrome and approaches to it.

On 1.5.42, the B.M.P. at MYITKYINA were transferred to the Myitkyina Bn. B.F.F.  Subedar Major RAHIM DAD KHAN, who had done excellent work throughout, became Subedar Major of the Myitkyina Bn.  Major M.D. HINDLE was transferred to the Myitkyina Bn., B.F.F., Major a. SMITH to the Bhamo Bn. B.F.F. and Major H. CHAPPELL to the H.Q., B.F.F.

Sd/.  H.CHAPPELL

Major BFF.
Later [sic – Late] B.C., 2nd Rangoon Bn. B.M.P.

 

[09 December 2017]