The Burma Campaign

[Transcribed from National Archives File WO 203/5699, “F.F.1’s Part in [the] Burma Campaign” by:  Steve Rothwell - The Burma Campaign web site.]

 

 

F.F.1’s Part in the Burma Campaign

by

Lt. Col. W.R.V. Russell M.C.

 

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­______________________________________________

 

D.O. No. 1881

Office of the Commandant
Chin Hills Battalion, Burma Frontier Force

Dated Falam, the … 19th May 1943

My Dear Col. Foucar,[1]

I enclose an account of what F.F.1 did in the BURMA campaign.  Also an account of our trip in the YOMA’s by Capt. Manning[2] who went with us part of the way.

I am afraid, like all stories of the Burma campaign it is a sad one.  We might have achieved so much but actually achieved so little.  It was mostly an endless march backwards from good position to good position under orders but seldom being engaged by the Japs.

I have started by giving you the organisation of F.F.1, which you may not know, and included one or two comments and criticisms which may or may not be of interest.

The men were splendid throughout a very trying campaign.

I have found it difficult to remember dates and places – perhaps you will be able to get hold of the War Diary of F.F.1.[3]  I have tried to link up what happened in F.F.1 with what was happening elsewhere at the time so that you will be able to work out the dates.

Yours Sincerely,
[signed] W.R.V. Russell
Lt. Col

Lieut. Col. E.C.V. FOUCAR,
General Staff, India
SIMLA

 

SECRET

Account of F.F.1’s part in Burma Campaign by Lt.Col. W.R.V. Russell, M.C.

Formation and Armament

F.F.1 was formed at KUTKAI under Major G.G. Pryce[4] in 1940 [14th July 1940[5]].  It consisted of three companies of infantry and one squadron M.I. [mounted infantry].

The companies of infantry came one from Bhamo Battalion B.F.F. (Chingpaws) and two from PYAWBWE (GURKHAS).[6]  At later dates one of these [sic] company of Gurkhas left FF1 to start in the formation of FF II [F.F.2] and the Kachin company went to form FF4.  These were replaced by a Kachin Company from Lashio and a GURKHA company from MYITKYINA.[7]

The formation of FF1 from so many different battalions was a mistake, I think, as the men still regarded themselves as lent from their Battalion in each of which there was a great esprit de corps.  It would have been better for cooperation and esprit de corps if each FF had been formed from one Battalion, when the mobile detachment could have been called MYITKYINA FF or BHAMO FF, with the regimental tradition of their own Battalion behind them they would have had a name to be proud of.

The force was armed with two Lewis guns per company to begin with but shortly before the campaign a Bren gun per platoon arrived.

After war started in Dec a 3” Mortar detachment per company arrived; unfortunately bombs did not arrive until many months afterwards, so that our mortars were useless tubes. Luckily we had bombs when we went into action for the first time, and in this respect were luckier than most F.Fs.  It was a pity that our men were able to have little or no training in this important arm.

The FF was well supplied with W/T sets.  One per company and one for H.Q.  These sets subsequently stood the campaign better than the army sets and the operators were good.  Unfortunately they had to be handed over to the army when the army sets broke down, or were lost, later in the campaign.[8]

There was M.T. [motor transport] sufficient to move force H.Q. and one company at a time and sufficient A.T. (A.T. Carts and pack mules) to move the whole force if necessary.  The muleteers were Chinese, they did us well throughout the campaign until later the whole A.T. of the force was taken over by the Army.  The M.T. were good, the vehicles standing up well.  Most of them got as far as Kalewa where they were destroyed towards the end of the campaign.

At the beginning of the war the men were well trained in tactics and well fitted to carry out their role against the Japs.  Everyman was a signaller.  It was unfortunate that the mortar arrived so late in the campaign that we had no time to demonstrate or practice its uses.

------------

In November 1941 Lieut. W.R.V. Russell,[9] had taken over from Col. Pryce.  On 27 Dec 41 F.F.1 was moved to PANGKEM in Southern Shan States on the LOIMWE road where they arrived on January 5th.  The M.I. [mounted infantry][10] were detached and sent to MONGSAT, south of this road near the MEKONG to guard the right flank of 1 Brigade, H.Q. LOIMWE.  One company with M.T. was placed under 13 Brigade and sent to LOIKAW.

The two infantry companies at PANGKEM were to follow the M.I. to MONGSAT when supplies allowed.  In actual fact this never materialised.

Other than patrol activity across the Thai border FF1 saw no active service in these months.[11]

FF1 (less M.I.) were next moved to south of PYU on the TOUNGOO-RANGOON road in February 42 where H.Q. 1 Bde was to follow us.  At the battle of PYUNTAZA [11th March 1942] one Gurkha column of FF1 under Capt. D.R. TURNER[12] was sent out on the right flank of 1 Bde.[13]  This column was joined later by a Kachin column of FF1 with FF H.Q. under Capt. Forbes[14] who took command, as Russell had been sent off on a long recce [12th March[15]].  Captain Manning of the Forest Service acted as guide and liaison with the civil.[16]

This force had only one W.T. set as the others, including charging engine had been taken over by the Army.  Also only one 3”mortar as the other had been lent to the RAJPUTS [the 2nd Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment].

The route taken [presumably by Captain Turner’s Column] was PENWEGON (On road Toungoo-Rangoon) – DAINGTAYA – MYAUNGSHE, where there was a brush with two BURMANS in a bullock cart who fired on the advance guard but were killed by a Havildar with a T.S.M.G. [Thompson sub-machine gun], - CHAUNGGWE where the column arrived about 15th March. [17]

The force then received intimation that Div had retired to TOUNGOO which left them in the air. They were ordered to proceed North and try and rejoin.  By this time 7 days rations were finished.[18]

For several days the force marched north by forced marches, Capt Manning, leading them through jungle road along streams to avoid the Jap troops which were now between them and the 1 BURMA DIVISION.

At PYU CHAUNG W.T. batteries were running low and the Div had further retired, in M.T.  We could not catch up.  At SATCHAUNG Major Russell contacted them with batteries.[19]

The force marched on through KABAUNG Post House down the KABAUNG CHAUNG to NABUMYAUNG [to the West of Oktwin and Toungoo].  Here one of our patrols met the Japanese and were lost.  Later we heard that they had all escaped except one, running through the Japs and joining the Chinese.

It was obvious that this line of retreat was cut and the only way was to go west over the YOMAS to PROME.[20]  By this time we were out of food and the men exhausted by marching and lack of food.  Luckily we found a rice store here and proceeded west to KYETSHA.

We were joined by 200 stragglers (Kachins, P.Ms [Punjabi Mussalmen]) from FF4 and some GURKHAS from a GURKHA regiment.  We made a 3rd column out of these.  They were pretty shaken and demoralised and would have been little use to us.  They were a great drain on our food supplies.

The column came out at PAUKKAUNG in the PROME district [at midnight 1st April 1942] only to find the road had been cut to PROME.  Here we were joined by a Company of the Kokine Battalion.  We then marched north to SHWEBANDAYAN [Shwebandaw] but were again too late and found the road cut.[21] [22]

Here we were joined by 63 Bde [this was actually the 13th Indian Infantry Brigade, not the 63rd [23]] under which was the M.I. of F.F.1.  The M.I. were attacked that night by Japs surrounded and nearly all killed [10th April at Didokpin].[24]  The M.I. ceased to be a fighting force.  A great disappointment as we were hoping to meet old friends whom we had not seen from some time.  Next morning F.F.1 reoccupied the village in which the M.I. had been attacked.  The Japs withdrew after firing a few shots.

We marched on again north and on our way ran into an ambush, probably of Burmans, however they ran away when attacked and we suffered no casualties and we rejoined 1 BURDIV, south of TAUNGDWINGYI.  This must have been about the end of March [actually on or just before 10th April].  Our A.T. was then taken over by 1 Bde [1st Burma Infantry Brigade] and we were sent in M.T. back to YENANGYAUNG to refit and recoup, as we had been weakened by lack of food.[25]

It was then decided by the Higher command to break up the big F.Fs and make them into smaller mobile units, of 2 companies each.[26]  The old FF1 was made into a new F.F.1 of two companies of GURKHAS under Capt. L.G. Gaudie,[27] but he went sick the first day and Capt. D.R. Turner took command.  It also formed with the Kachin company of F.F.4 a new F.F.4.  The M.I., or what was left, was combined with other M.I. columns.[28]

This reorganisation from F.F.1s point of view appears to have been a pity.  Up till then it had been a whole fighting unit trained to fighting together [sic] and used to its officers.  Its scouting ability had enabled it to hold its own against the Japs.  Now new officers were drafted in and it was mixed up with other units under officers and N.C.Os it did not know, while its officers and men did not know their new jobs.  Their M.I., mortars and W.T. sets had been removed.

Some time later [on or just before 16th April 1942] these newly formed F.Fs[29] moved back to the North of the PIN CHAUNG where they were camped prior to being sent out as an information screen.  1 BURDIV was still forward West of MAGWE.

A Japanese party succeeded in infiltrating through to the PIN CHAUNG and blocked the road to YENANGYAUNG north of the Chaung.  Trying to trap the M.T. and some tanks and the F.F. columns between them and the chaung, they blocked the road at this place [16th April 1942].

The FFs were ordered to try and break the block, but owing to the new reorganisation there was little central control, and no mortars to support the advance.  The Officers were mostly straight from O.C.T.Us and did not realise what was expected.  It appears to have bee a disjointed effort.  The block was broken and the M.T. got out but FF1 suffered many casualties (50% killed, wounded, lost) they came up against very heavy M.M.G. and Mortar fire [17th April 1942].

The Japs put a second block behind them on the PIN CHAUNG [night of 17th/18th April].  The F.Fs had now got completely disorganised and scattered over the plains, some got into lorries and drove off, only one company of F.F.3 under Capt. Scott[30] stayed to hold off the Japs.  The others were not collected till night fall.

A determined effort should have been made to turn about and attack the second Jap block, but the Japs were thus allowed to dig in and later did a lot of harm to BURDIV before they eventually broke out.

It was altogether a disappointing ending to a battle which was begun well.[31] [32]

As I was no longer an O.C. F.F. I was not present at this battle until right at the end.[33]  A better account could be given by Lieut. Col. G.G. Pryce, C.C. F.F. BURCORPS [Commander Corps Frontier Force] who commanded.

After this F.F.1 was amalgamated with F.F.7 and went out with 1 BDE in their march to India.[34]  Capt. D.R. Turner commanded.  The new F.F.4 under Capt. E.G. Forbes went up to MYITKYINA but never arrived.  It was I believed payed [sic] off at NABA on the way up, the Kachins being sent back to their homes.  Capt. D.R. TURNER and E.G. FORBES could tell you more about these later stages.

During the later stages F.F.1 fought a battle at MONYWA where Subedar BAGHANDOJ RAI was blinded but continued to command his company, being led round by the hand.  It was a pity that the application for an award for this was put in too late [1st May 1942[35]].

 

[signed] W.R.V. Russell

Lt. Col. M.C.
Commandant, Chin Hills Battalion,
The Burma Regiment.

 

09 December 2017


[1] Foucar

[2] Manning

[3] No war diary survived the withdrawal.

[4] Pryce

[5] “Burma Frontier Force by Lt. Col G.G. Pryce”, WO 203/5697.

[6] The Bhamo Battalion, Burma Frontier Force was based in the Northern Shan States.  Pyawbwe was the headquarters and depot of the Reserve Battalion, B.F.F.

[7] Lashio and Myitkyina were the headquarters locations of the Northern Shan States and Myitkyina Battalions, Burma Frontier Force respectively.

[8] “As Frontier Force sets were required to operate over long distances, standard Army sets were unsuitable and all Frontier Force sets had to be either purchased in the open market or constructed by the Signals from components purchased in the open market.  As the war progressed, this source of supply became more and more unsatisfactory and was at the point of breaking down just prior to the evacuation (“Burma Frontier Force 1939-1942”By Lt.Col H.M. Day, WO 203/5694 ("Burma Frontier Force 1939-1942” by Lt.Col H.M. Day, WO 203/5694 )).

[9] Russell

[10] The Mounted Infantry Column of F.F.1 was commanded by Captain J. Kennedy.  See “Account of the action of F.F.1 – M.I. Column[10] in Burma by Captain J. Kennedy”, WO 203/5697.

[11] In Captain Kennedy’s account of the Mounted Infantry he describes a raid on a Thai outpost carried out by a small force “Turcol” and some of the Mounted Infantry, under the command of Captain D.R. Turner (“Account of the action of F.F.1 – M.I. Column[11] in Burma by Captain J. Kennedy”, WO 203/5697).

[12] David Rae Turner. Emergency Commission as 2nd Lt. to the General List (217666), 26th October 1941.  As Captain, Column Commander of a Gurkha Column, F.F.1, Burma Frontier Force at Pyuntaza, February 1942.  Became Commanding Officer of F.F.1, Burma Frontier Force when the appointed C.O., Captain Gaudie, went sick, mid-April 1942.  Continued as Commanding Officer of F.F.1 following the amalgamation with F.F.7, May 1942.  War substantive Lieutenant, 1st October 1942.  As temporary Major, served as Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Burma Section, appointed 20th November 1944  (“Burma Frontier Force by Lt. Col G.G. Pryce”, WO 203/5697; “F.F.1’s Part in the Burma Campaign by Lt. Col. W.R.V. Russell M.C.”, WO 203/5699; British Army List; Indian Army List October 1945; London Gazette).

[13] It seems Captain Turner’s Column was at Penwegon. The other infantry column, with presumably the F.F.1 Headquarters under Captain Forbes, was attached to the 1st Burma Infantry Brigade and had orders to watch for enemy movements on the right flank of the brigade in the area of Egyan (East-gyanzu) to the West of Nyaunglebin and Pyuntaza.  On 11th March 1942 the Column was ordered to revert to the direct command of the 1st Burma Division.  The Mechanised Column of F.F.1 was expected to arrive at Peinzalok, to the North of Nyaunglebn, on the morning of 12th March where it was to join the divisional reserve (War Diary of the 1st Burma Infantry Division, WO 172/447).

[14] Forbes

[15] Major Russell was sent to reconnoitre the route across the Pegu Yomas from Toungoo to Prome (War Diary of the 1st Burma Infantry Division, WO 172/447).

[16] Manning and also Manning’s account

[17] The 1st Burma Division began a two stage withdrawal to the line of the Pyu Chaung on the night of 13th/14th March.  Captain Turner’s Column at Penwegon was ordered to take the route from there westwards to Chaunggwe/Udo, as described in the account above.  Captain Forbes with the remaining infantry column at Egyan, was ordered to withdraw via Myogyaung, to the West of Pyawbyegon at the foot of the Pegu Yomas.  On the second night, 14th/15th March, Forbe’s force was expected to continue north-eastwards into the Pegu Yomas and to join Turner’s Column at Udo (Chaunggwe) (War Diary of the 1st Burma Infantry Division, WO 172/447).

[18] On 15th March orders for the 1st Burma Division were changed.  The Division’s objectives were now to cover the arrival of the 5th Chinese Army in the area Thazi-Toungoo and then to move to Prome, to join the 17th Indian Division as part of the newly formed 1st Burma Corps.  (War Diary of the 1st Burma Infantry Division, WO 172/447).

[19] Major Russell had completed his reconnaissance mission and rejoined Headquarters, 1st Burma Division and on the afternoon of 17th March 1942 was ordered to rejoin F.F.1.  He took with him orders for F.F.1 to move North from Udo on the far West flank of the division, in the Pegu Yomas, to “cut in” on the route from Toungoo to Prome and to protect the South flank of that route pending its use by other troops.  On 18th March, the Division believed that F.F.1 was moving from the Udo area to Mobon in anticipation of a further withdrawal northwards at the F.F.1 commander’s discretion (War Diary of the 1st Burma Infantry Division, WO 172/447).

[20] This was in fact the intention the 1st Burma Division had for F.F.1.  On 21st March F.F.1 were still out of touch with the division but it was known that F.F.1 was low on supplies and that their wireless batteries were almost exhausted.  Given this it is assumed that Major Russell did not rejoin F.F.1 at Satchaung with the vital wireless batteries until after 21st March,  The 5th Burma Rifles were ordered to make their way Prome across the Pegu Yomas on foot and were to take F.F.1 under command if encountered (War Diary of the 1st Burma Infantry Division, WO 172/447).

[21] Messages sent by F.F.1 to the headquarters of the 1st Burma Infantry Division, state that Paukkaung was reached at midnight, 1st April 1942.  Here the detachment “collected” a platoon from the 5th Burma Rifles and “one Karen Column of the Kokine Battalion without transport” (War Diary of the 1st Burma Infantry Division, WO 172/447).

[22] Having transferred from the Southern Shan States to the Prome front, the 1st Burma Division took up defensive positions around Allanmyo and stretching to Kyaukpadaung to the East and to Dayindabo to the South along the Irrawaddy valley.  On 29th March 1942 F.F.1, whilst still en route across the Pegu Yomas, was under the direct command of the 1st Burma Division, as Divisional Troops, except for the Mounted Infantry Column which was attached to the 13th Indian Infantry Brigade.  On 31st March the Mounted Infantry were placed under the command of the 1st Burma Brigade which was to concentrate in the Dayindabo area.  The Mechanised Column of F.F.1 which had until then been under the commend of the 1st Burma Brigade was to revert to direct commend of the 1st Burma Division (i.e. Divisional troops) upon arrival of the Mounted Infantry in the 1st Burma Brigade’s area.  

On 1st April, the employment of the Mounted Infantry Column of F.F1 and the Divisional carrier Platoon was set out in Operational Instruction No. 17.  The M.I. Column and the Carrier Platoon were to watch the tracks to the South of the Division to provide early reports of any Japanese movement northwards.  One troop of the M.I. was to remain under command of the 1st Burma Brigade and to watch the tracks to the East of the main road.  The remainder of the M.I. Column, F.F.1, was placed under the command of the 13th Indian Brigade and ordered to watch the tracks to the South of the brigade area around Kyaukpadaung.

By now the 17th Indian Division had withdrawn from the Prome area and the 1st Burma Division in the Allanmyo area was to protect the 17th Division’s continuing withdrawal, prior to its own withdrawal to the Yin Chaung line, South of Magwe.  The orders for F.F.1 issued on 3rd April were to move into the 1st Burma Division reserve, moving from Shwebandaw via Allanmyo not later than the night of 4th/5th April.  On arrival with the divisional Reserve, F.F.1 was to reabsorb its detached Mounted Infantry and Mechanised Columns.  A subsequent order modified the original plan and F.F.1 was now ordered to join up the the Mounted Infantry detachments working with the 13th Indian Brigade and to move to Mogaung via Kyetyongale where F.F.1 would come under the command of the 13th Indian Brigade.  The Mounted Infantry troop and Mechanised Column detached to the 1st Burma Brigade was to remain with that brigade.

On arriving at Kyakpadaung on the morning of 4th April, F.F.1 contacted Captain Kennedy of the Mounted Infantry Column.  Kennedy had only five men under his command, having been attacked at the village of Sindok at around midnight the previous evening.  Kennedy’s command was forced to disperse under Japanese mortar fire and withdrew to Kyaukpadaung.  That evening F.F.1 resumed its march to Mogaung via Sakangyi and Kyetongale with the Mounted Infantry Column and the Divisional carrier platoon under command.  The 1st Burma Division issued new orders that day, instructing the Mounted Infantry Column to join the 1st Burma Brigade with effect from 6th April (War Diary of the 1st Burma Infantry Division, WO 172/447).

[23] War Diary of the 1st Burma Infantry Division, WO 172/447.

[24] On the morning of 7th April, the 1st Burma Brigade was ordered to despatch the Mounted Infantry with a wireless set to the village of Didokpin where the Mounted Infantry where to come under the command of the 13th Indian Brigade.  The 13th Indian Brigade was ordered to despatch an infantry detachment to support the Mounted Infantry.  The Mounted Infantry arrived in Didokpin on the morning of 10th April where they were ambushed by the Japanese, estimated to be two companies in strength.  The survivors fell back northwards on Kanhla and were closely followed up by the Japanese.   The Mounted Infantry survivors were attached to F.F.1 and after reporting that evening to Brigadier Curtis, commander of the 13th Indian Brigade, Kennedy was evacuated to a hospital ship on the river where his wound was operated upon.  He saw no further action and joined the general withdrawal to India.  It seems F.F.1 was withdrawn into reserve shortly afterwards where it underwent reorganisation along with F.F.3 and F.F.4 (War Diary of the 1st Burma Infantry Division, WO 172/447; “Account of the action of F.F.1 – M.I. Column in Burma” by Captain J. Kennedy, WO 203/5697).

[25] The 1st Burma Infantry Division collected up large numbers of bullock carts and issued them to the brigades, intending to make them more mobile when moving off main roads than might be possible with motor transport.  This reallocation of animal transport occurred on 10th April 1942 (War Diary of the 1st Burma Infantry Division, WO 172/447).

[26] According to Lt. Colonel Pryce’s account the reorganisation of the F.F.s began on 4th April and was complete by the morning of 16th April (“Burma Frontier Force by Lt. Col G.G. Pryce”, WO 203/5697).

[27] Gaudie

[28] The survivors of the Mounted Infantry column, F.F.1 were amalgamated with the Mounted Infantry Column of F.F.3 near Yenangyaung between 10th and 16th April 1942.  This new Mounted Infantry Column was commanded by Captain G.B. Thunder and retained by the 1st Burma Division (“Burma Frontier Force by Lt. Col G.G. Pryce”, WO 203/5697).

[29] F.F.1, F.F.3 and F.F.4 according to the Indian Official History (“Indian Armed Forces in World War II, The Retreat from Burma 1941-42”, Prasad, B, Orient Longmans (1954)).

[30] Scott

[31] Lt. Colonel Pryce has provided a detailed account of the actions of the F.F.s at the Pin Chaung.

“In the evening of 16th April when at _________ (I forget the name of the place but the road goes right to Kyaukpadaung and a left branch goes to Chauk [the village is Gwegyo]), I was ordered to detail two F.Fs. to proceed to the two tracks between the two routes MAGWE – YENANGYAUNG, TAUNGDWINGYI – NATMAUK along which 1 Burdiv and 17 Div respectively were withdrawing.  I proceeded there and gave orders to the Os.C. [Officers Commanding] F.F.1 & F.F.3 (Major D.R. Turner and Major J.H. Turner).  I was about to return to Corps H.Qrs about 2030 hours but stopped to speak to Capt. Forbes.  A station wagon passed me proceeding in the direction of the village where the Kyaukpadaung and Chauk roads fork.  When it reached a point about 500 yards ahead, just before the rise in the ground, a sudden burst of L.A. [light automatic] fire was heard and the station wagon burst into flames.  F.F. Commanders were called and ordered to arrange local protection while proceeding with their preparations to move as ordered.  Shortly afterwards the driver of the station wagon came in and reported that the fore had come from the East of the road.  Several vehicles from the North then came through unmolested.  About this time 2 Bn. R. Tanks Corps [2nd Royal Tank Regiment] arrived.  The officer commanding was given all information and stated that he proposed to push on, so I ordered F.Fs. 1 & 3 to be prepared to follow the Tanks.  The first tank went up the road and when opposite the burning station wagon, one of its tracks was blown off by a grenade or mine and the road was blocked.  O.C. 2nd Bn. R.T.C. [2nd Royal Tank Regiment] then decided to remain for the night or until the road was clear, sent a tank up near the disabled tank, ordered the crew of the latter to evacuate their tank as soon as covering fire was opened by the 2nd tank.  This was done successfully and the crew were evacuated safely.  Shortly afterwards the tank was set alight by the enemy.

I then ordered F.F.4. to sweep the area E of the road and they moved off about 2330 hours.  Throughout the night there were a number of bursts of L.A. fire and the noise of crackers etc., but it was obvious that no contact was made.  I therefore decided to put a sweep through on both sides of the road, starting just before dawn.  F.F.1. was detailed.  At first no opposition was encountered.  At about dawn heavy fire was heard and F.F.4. was later seen withdrawing on the EAST of the road and suffered considerable casualties.  F.F.1. was then held up on the East of the road but advanced on WEST of the road for a time, when this flank was also held up by fire further to the West.  One Pl. F.F.3. was then despatched to deal with this enemy post and receiving valuable aid from a section of tanks, were able to overcome the opposition and the advance continued.  The right flank was still held up and the tanks were unable to help.  I went to this flank and was able to get a small party of about 1 section forward to within 50 yards of the high ground occupied by the enemy.  About ½ of the section became casualties and further progress was impossible owing to the enfilade fire of a L.A. further to the East.  By this time those n the West of the road had advanced and were about level with the party on the East of the road.  I proceeded over to them, decided to put in an attack on the high ground on the EAST of the road from the West, and went back to arrange for co-operation with the Tanks.  The O.C. Tank Bn., put one tp. at my disposal to support the attack.  One A.A. [anti-aircraft] gun also came into action and engaged the enemy position.  The attack went in and the enemy evacuated the position and withdrew to the East.  having proceeded about 300 yards to the EAST of the road a position was occupied under heavy S.A.A. and Mortar fire.  The Tanks and a good deal of the transport which had been piling up all night went through.  The enemy then infiltrated round our flanks and got back to the road preventing any further movement along the road and also taking us in the rear.  A Company of the KOYLI [King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry] who were on the far side of the road block had occupied the highest ground astride the road further to the North and we withdrew on them.  On our departure a flight of about 12 Japanese bombers bombed what transport remained in PINCHAUNG [sic].

1. Two points about this engagement were that the Enemy Mortars appeared to be firing not shell but a missile which upon striking made a lot of noise but inflicted few[?] casualties.

2. A great number of the enemy[?] were wearing felt hats, khaki uniforms and our equipment and were armed with our rifles.

F.Fs. 1 & 3 suffered a number of casualties and were then concentrated at the village where the Kyaukpadaung and Chauk roads fork [Gwegyo].  From there they were sent to Mt. POPA, where [?] information was received that the enemy were advancing in strength on KYAUKPADAUNG.  F.Fs. 1 & 3 were ordered to protect that village.  After the withdrawal from there F.F.3 was placed under command 1 Burdiv and Major J. Turner can give any further information.

F.F.1. was then retained as Corps troops” (“Burma Frontier Force by Lt. Col G.G. Pryce”, WO 203/5697).

[33] Russell had been appointed Commander Frontier Force (C.F.F.) to the 1st Burma Division.  On 20th April both he and Captain G.B. Thunder had been made officers in charge of “straggler posts”, charged with collecting stragglers for subsequent collection by their brigades (“Burma Frontier Force by Lt. Col G.G. Pryce”, WO 203/5697; War Diary of the 1st Burma Infantry Division, WO 172/447 ).

[34] On 6th May 1942, the 1st Burma Brigade noted that one column each of F.F.1 and of F.F.7 had joined the brigade.  Little is known about this F.F.7 column.  The Headquarters F.F.7 and two columns (one Chin and one Gurkha) had been evacuated by sea from Rangoon to India on 7th March.  By mid-March F.F.7 was encamped at Elephant Falls, near Shillong in Assam, India.  In May, the Chin column, under Captain H.E.W. Braund, went to join the Chin Levies.  It is not known what became of the Gurkha column under Captain C.A. McDowall.  After arrival with the Brigade in India, on 28th May the F.F.1 and F.F.7 columns left the Brigade for the Burma Frontier Force Camp at milestone 107 on the Tamu-Manipur road where they were presumably disbanded (War Diary of the 1st Burma Brigade, WO 172/547;  “Distinctly I Remember: a personal story of Burma”, Braund, H. E. W., Wren (1972)).

[35] Moving with Burcorps Headquarters, F.F.1 under the command of Major Turner arrived at Songon, 16 miles to the North of Monywa on 30th April.  Monywa was held by a detachment of the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment and the river patrol of Royal Marines, Force “Viper”.  This small garrison came under heavy fire from across the Chindwin River that evening.  That night F.F.1 was sent by Burcorps to bolster the Monywa garrison.  The next morning however, under the cover of heavy fire and intense air activity, the Japanese successfully crossed the river and secured a foothold in Monywa.  Being no more than 250 strong and with no heavy weapons, the combined garrison was forced to withdraw to high ground about two miles North of the town.  The detachment of Gloucesters and F.F.1 withdrew again and by 2nd May were in an area North of Alon on the Monywa-Yeu road.  That evening, the remainder of the Gloucesters, with an F.F.7 column under command arrived and together with some mountain artillery and a few anti-tank guns  were formed into a composite force under the command of the Gloucesters’ Commanding Officer, Lt. Colonel Bagot and known as “Bagot” Force.  This force was directed to delay the Japanese for as long as possible whilst the 1st Burma Division completed its withdrawal from Monywa and took up positions around Budalin astride the road and railway to Yeu.  F.F.1 were at the rear of the position, with orders to patrol to the West and North out to about eight miles.  F.F.7 were placed on the right flank with orders to patrol out to three miles.  F.F.1 and F.F.7 remained with “Bagot” Force until it was dissolved around Yeu.  On the evening of 3rd May tanks of the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment withdrew on to the Budalin position and harboured behind the forward troops of “Bagot” Force.  In the early hours of 4th May, the Commanding Officer of F.F.7 reported enemy movement on his front and that he had withdrawn his column to Budalin.  Here he was ordered to hold a gap between two of the Gloucesters’ companies.  Before dawn a small force of Japanese supported by three tanks attempted to dislodge the Force.  However they were beaten off.  At 06:30 orders were received for “Bagot” Force to withdraw to Yeu.  A section of mountain guns and F.F.1 provided rearguard cover.  Following the successful withdrawal of the force, F.F.1 were ordered to rejoin Frontier Force Headquarters.  Presumably F.F.7 joined them.  Both columns joined the 1st Burma Brigade on 6th May for the march to India from Pyu Gaing through Pantha to Tamu (“Indian Armed Forces in World War II, The Retreat from Burma 1941-42”, Prasad, B, Orient Longmans (1954); “Burma Frontier Force by Lt. Col G.G. Pryce”, WO 203/5697; “Narrative of the Burma Campaign, 1 Glosters”, War Diary of the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment, WO 172/861).