14th Burma Rifles

1-1-42

4th Coy started forming

1-1-42

No.4 Shan Labour Coy started forming

1-1-42

Jem[adar] Sao Tun Po & Jem: Hkun Kyan War Posted to No.4 Shan Labour Coy

1-1-42

12 Other Ranks War Posted to No.4 Shan Labour Coy.

1-1-42

1 Declared Deserter.

1-1-42

4 men discharged.

1-1-42

12 Recruits enlisted.

2-1-42

12 Recruits enlisted.

3-1-42

24 Recruits enlisted.

4-1-42

52 Recruits enlisted.

4-1-42

3 Other Ranks War Posted to No.4 Shan Labour Coy.

5-1-42

53 Recruits enlisted.

5-1-42

1 Other Rank War Posted to No.4 Shan Labour Coy.

7-1-42

21 Recruits enlisted.

7-1-42

1 War Posted to No.4 Shan Labour Coy.

9-1-42

1 dismissed by Summary Court Martial.

9-1-42

2 Recruits enlisted.

10-1-42

1 man died.

15-1-42

14 Recruits enlisted.

16-1-42

1 Recruit discharged.

17-1-42

1      “       enlisted.

20-1-42

1     “             “

22-1-42

1 Recruit enlisted.

22-1-42

1 War Posted to No.4 Shan Labour Coy.

24-1-42

1 Recruit enlisted.

24-1-42

1 War Posted to No.4 Shan Labour Coy.

25-1-42

1 man died.

26-1-42

1 Recruit enlisted.

27-1-42

2 A.A. L.M.G. Posts [anti-aircraft machine gun] established at No.2 A.T. [Animal Transport] Coy Old Lines.

NO. 34/14/5

J.D. Tucker [1]

14 Burif
Taunggyi
31-1-42 [2]

Lieut Col
Comdt 14 Burif

1-2-42

2 men discharged.

5-2-42

11 Recruits transferred from 13 BURIF

7-2-42

1 Recruit enlisted

12-2-42

2 recruits enlisted

12-2-42

Mongnai Post withdrawn and transferred to the following location – LOILEM/LAIKHA road to guard petrol dumps.

            M/S 2.5.     1 Pln: less 1 Sec:
            M/S 3.7.     1 Sec:

13-2-42

1 Recruit enlisted

16-2-42

1 man died

17-2-42

4 men discharged

18-2-42

1 man discharged

18-2-42

1 man enlisted

18-2-42

1 War Posted to No.4 Shan Labour Coy.

20-2-42

1 man enlisted

21-2-42

1 man enlisted

25-2-42

1 man enlisted

NO. 81/14/5

J.D. Tucker

14 Burif:

Lieut., Col,
Comdt 14 Burif:

TAUNGGYI  DATED 1-3-42

1-4-42

1 Pl of C Coy under Jem[adar] Ng Pwint moved to LOIKAW and NANTAMPAK to relieve pl guarding bridge there.

2-4-42

1 Pl of B Coy under Jem Khun Leng returned from LOIKAW and NANTAMPAK after being relieved.

3-4-42

Jem Long Kyio and 6 men detailed as escort for a food train proceeding to MYINGYAN from SHWENYAUNG.

3-4-42
(approx)

1) Capt Sao Hom Hpa[3] (Sawbwa[4] of N. Homin State) proceeded to LASHIO to organise state guerrillas and supervise police arrangements on road BURMA-CHINA running through NORTH HSENWI STATE.

2) 2/Lt Sao Hkim Tha[5] assumed command of A Coy.

8-4-42
(approx)

Lt Zaw Win[6] (7 Burif) attached to 14 Burif for light duties.

14-4-42

16 Rfn deserted from SHWENYAUNG post taking their arms and 600 rds A.A.A. [small arms ammunition].

15-4-42

Air Raid in TAUNGGYI by 27 JAP bombers at 1230 hrs.  1. Rfm killed.  Town patrols and [illegible word] parties reorganised.  No case of looting reported.  All troops did good work.

16-4-42

Lt Zaw Win proceeded to LAWKSAWK to evacuate his family.  He remained at LAWKSAWK owing to illness and did not return to unit.

Withdrew No 1. AA LMG Post in TAUNGGYI under authority from HQ S.S.A. [Shan States Area – the command responsible for the lines of communication in that area].

SHWENYAUNG and YINMABIN dets of A Coy moved to A Coy HQ at KALAW on orders of HQ S.S.A.

16-4-42
(approx)

Received orders from HQ S.S.A. regarding evacuation of TAUNGGYI.

Substance of orders as follows:  14 Burif personnel in TAUNGGYI and BFF (SSS Bn) [Southern Shan States Battalion, Burma Frontier Force] personnel in TGI were detailed as Rear Party & were to remain in TGI until the Chinese had withdrawn to a line just SOUTH of rd TAUNGGYI-HOPONG when they were to proceed to HSIPAW and LASHIO via SHWENYAUNG and LAWKSAWK.  Bullock cart and pack mule tpt was allotted.  HQ B Coy and two pls guarding NANTONG and NAMPAWN bridges were to hand over their bridges to the Chinese tps on their withdrawal after which they were to join HQ[?] 13 Burif at KAHSI MANSAM [Ke-Hsi Mansam].

17-4-42
(approx)

1) Lt Col Brocklehurst[7] Comd No 2 S.S. Det [No 2 Special Service Detachment[8]] placed in command of TGI [Taunggyi] Rear Party

2) A Coy (less Jem Mg Aye 2 Havs[havildars] & 8 Rfn) stationed at KALAW deserted on night of 17/18 Apr.  The coy took their arms (rifles & bayonets) and 26,000 rds of S.A.A. and their two patrol lorries and proceeded to LAWKSAWK where they split up.  2/Lt Sao Hkim Tha and Jem Sao Kya Sone deserted with men and organised the desertion.

3) During this period desertions in TGI, especially from the recruits (D Coy) became widespread.  As many deserters were taking their arms and S.A.A., all arms and SAA were withdrawn from the men and kept in rifle [llots? illegible] and only issued for guards and duties only.  Surplus arms & ammunition were returned to TGI Advance Depot.  In spite of serious desertions from the lines V.P. [Vital Point] guards and AA LMG posts remained at their posts with only an occasional desertion although they could only be relieved once a week.  One reason given for desertions was the non receipt of all pay due to them up to date in their accumulated savings.  All men were paid up fully to 31 Mar incl all accumulated credits.  Morale became very low after the Air Raid and many more men deserted with the exception of men on guard & duties as previously detailed.

17-4-42
(approx)

Nominal strength of personnel in TGI was approx as follows:

B Coy (less 3 Pls)        40 men.           HQ 14 Burif

C Coy (less 1 Pl)          90 men

D Coy (recruits)           200 men

But by 18 Apr only about 100 men remained in TGI.

19-4-42

1)  Jem Long Kyio returned from train escort to MYINGYAN.   Hav[ildar] Mg Win and 1 Rfn were missing after a heavy air raid on THAZI when they were passing through.

2) All AA LMG posts in TGI were withdrawn under orders from HQ SSA.

3) Balance of A Coy at KALAW withdrawn to TGI.  This party deserted on night 19/20 Apr.

4) One 3in Mortar and 3 Bren LMGs handed over to 2 S.S. Det under orders from HQ SSA and 3 Chinese Bren LMG’s received in exchange.

20-4-42

1) Jem Ng Avint and one pl C Coy returned from LOIKAW & NANPANTAK on relief by Chinese troops.  Col. J.F. Bowerman[9] liaison officer with the Chinese tps ordered the withdrawal of this pl to TGI.

2) Capt R.J.C. Clark[10] Comd C Coy evacuated by car to LASHIO on medical certificate.

3) At 2000 hrs Lt. Col Brocklehurst Comd TGI ordered the immediate evacuation of TGI.  Chinese resistance on road LOIKAW-HOPONG had collapsed and a Japanese armoured unit was advancing on HOPONG.  14 Burif was ordered to R.V. 10mls NORTH of SHWENYAUNG on road SHWENYAUNG-LAWKSAWK.

4) Capt S.K. Mojumder[11] ABRO(M) and 4 orderlies from the TGI Staging Sec reported to 14 Burif.

5) 14 Burif adv party reached R.V. 10mls NORTH of SHWEYAUNG at 2330 hrs.

21-4-42
(approx)

1) One Pl B Coy under Jem Sao Shere guarding NAMPAWN BR ordered to withdraw to LOILEM by a staff officer attd to HQ SSA.  The majority of the pl had deserted before the final withdrawal was ordered.

2) HQ B Coy & one pl at NAMTENG BR withdrew to KEHSI MANSAM.  HQ SSA order to them to withdraw there had not been received by OC 13 Burif, but as the Coy Comd (Capt Sao Hkim Aung) & the Pl Comd (Jem Han Tun) were both absent these men were disarmed and allowed to return to their houses.

22-4-42

1) Balance of personnel in TGI joined Adv Party bringing strength up to about 70.  During the withdrawal to INDIA the majority of these men fell out or deserted.  The Shans did NOT leave the Shan States and the last of the Kachins deserted in the KHODAUNG HILL TRACTS which are mainly populated by Kachins.  Personnel who fell out were paid up to date.  After crossing the R. SHWELI at INGINBIN only HQ personnel & Chins remained.

2) OC Force (TGI Rear Party) ordered the destruction of one 3” mortar and 3 (three) Chinese Bren guns owing to lack of tpt.

22-4-42

3) Camped at INDAW – NORTH of LAWKSAWK.  2/Lt Sao L Choe[12] one Hav and 8 men sent to LAWKSAWK to obtain & escort bullock cart tpt.

23-4-42

Camped at INDAW BR about 3 miles NORTH of INDAW.

24-4-42

1) Unit took over Rear Gd

2) Remained at INDAW BR

3) 2/Lt Sao L Choe returned to unit.

25-4-42

Remained at INDAW BR.

26-4-42

1) Moved to 10 MILE CAMP.

2) B.F.F. took over Rear Gd.

27-4-42

1) Marched to KUNHING.

2) Took over 40 Chinese mules from S.S.S. Bn [Southern Shan States Battalion, Burma Frontier Force].

28-7-42

1) Camped at 28 MILE CAMP.

2) Took over 12 mules & two riding ponies from No. 2 A.T. Coy B.A.S.C. with 12 mule leaders.

29-4-42

Marched to NAUNGWO village.

30-4-42

1) Capt Thompson[13] with about 80 Karen Levies (from Karen Coy 1 Burif) and Capt Nimmo[14] with a further 120 Karen Levies arrived NAUNGWO from LAIKA en route to GOKTEIK GORGE.

30-4-42

2) An M. Inf [Mounted Infantry] patrol from the SSS Bn were sent forward by Comd TGI Force and were ambushed by about 200 JAPS at NAMLAN.  The survivors had been informed by villagers that HSIPAW and LASHIO were occupied by Jap troops.  Comd TGI Force ordered all tps to R.V. about 5 mls SOUTH of the R. NAMTU.  14 Burif reported at the R.V. at about 1800 hrs and orders were received for the TGI Force to divide into units and proceed to MOGOK and BHAMO independently.  The TGI Force was split up as follows:

a) About 3 BO’s & 20 BOR’s of 2 SS Det (Comd Lt Col Brocklehurst).

b) About 100 I.OR’s [Indian Other Ranks] from SSS Bn (Comd Capt Hutchinson)[15]

c) About 100 IOR’s from SSS Bn (Comd Capt Prentice)[16]

d) About 70 BAOR’s from 14 Burif incl 30 Gurkhas from SSS Bn (Comd Lt Col J.D. Tucker)

30-4-42

Capt David King[17] Staff Officer to Comd TGI Force joined Capt Thompson’s party of Karen Levies.  This party was also joined by the balance of personnel of No. 2 A.T. Coy BASC (approx one Jemadar & 45 BAOR’s & 45 mules).

Copies (2) to D.A.A.G.  H.Q.  2nd Echelon (Burma)

Jhansi

J.D. Tucker   Lt Col
Comd  14 Burif

War Diary of the 14th (Shan States) Bn B.T.F. for the month of May 1942

1.5.42.

Proceeded to R. NAMTU.  Crossing facilities were limited and the unit was unable to cross this date.

2.5.42

1) Cross R. NAMTU by bamboo rafts, & loading ropes as the stream was very swift.  Mules & ponies swam.  One native dug out canoe was also utilised.

2) Six Mtd Inf [Mounted Infantry], the remainder of the Recce patrol ambushed at NAMLAN, under Naik Rattan Singh joined unit as they could not find their own unit.

3) Camped NORTH bank R.NAMTU.

3.5.42.

Marched to NAUNGLENG village on road MAYMYO – HSIPAW.

4.5.42.

Owing to the difficulty in obtaining reliable guides across country to MOGOK, the Unit proceeded to a point about 9 mls SOUTH of NAUNGHKIO (after crossing the GOTEIK GORGE by the iron bridge (road) which was still intact) and found a hack leading to KALAGWE.  After passing through NAUNGHKIO (which greatly troubled by armed dacoits at night) a Chinese Bn was met moving due NORTH along the road.  The Comd stated that they had evacuated MAYMYO just before the JAPANESE entered the town.  Camped about 2 miles WEST of road at about 2300 hrs.

5.5.42

Proceeded to HSIHKU village after narrowly missing a coy of Jap tps sent on recce from KALAGWE and occupying a local village.

6.5.42. & 7.5.42.

Proceeded by jungle tracks toward MONGLONG on road KEMAPYU–MOGOK.  Unit halted on hills SOUTH of MONGLONG as considerable tpt was heard on the road.  A patrol ascertained that the tpt was composed of a force of about 62 enemy vehicles, incl numerous AFV’s.  They were being held up by a road block or damaged road in a hollow for about 10 mins for each vehicle.  Vehicles arriving towards the end were not held up for very long.  The enemy halted in MONGLONG to take food and then proceeded towards MOGOK.  Sounds of a battle heard during night.  Unit withdrew to a village about 3 mls S.E. of MONGLONG.

7.5.42.

1) Dispensed with the services of the Chinese muleteers (& their 40 mules) as they could not be relied upon to obey orders.  They had previously disobeyed a firm order during an emergency.

2) As men were exhausted & the country very hilly & difficult 6 Lewis Guns were destroyed.

8.5.42.

1) Crossed road KEMAPYU-MOGOK about 3mls EAST of MONGLONG at about 0500 hrs

2) Split up into the following parties

a) 14 Burif personnel less Indian followers.

b) Gurkha party incl Indian followers

c) SSS Bn Mtd Infy ( 1Nk[naik] & 5 Sowars)

In addition a small party of 14 Burif Kachins proceeded independently.

Instructions and maps were issued to each party.  Orders were given to R.V. at BHAMO.  Each party was provided with pack mule tpt and money.  14 Burif party marched to NAMPAN and MANGHKUNG villages.

9.5.42.

Marched to KUNHKA and camped about 4 miles NW of this village.

10.5.42.

As no reliable information concerning the general military situation in BURMA was available it was decided to contact Capt Sao Hkim Hkyio [Sao Hkun Hkio] (Sawbwa of  Momeik State through which we were passing).[18]  Capt Hkim Hkyio was reported as being in a village about 2 mls EAST of MOMEIK [Möngmit].  Lt Col Tucker & Capt Macpherson[19] went forward & met Capt Hkim Hkyio who stated that KATHA and BHAMO were then held by the enemy.  The JAPS had sent forward information that they were arriving in MOMEIK that day en route to MYITSON.  About 5000 Chinese tps had been in the vicinity of MYITSON and were proceeding down the R. SHWELI and towards NAMHKAM.  Capt Thompson’s party had passed through MOMEIK about 3 days previously.

10.5.42.

Unit marched to a village about 8mls NE of MOMEIK.

11.5.42.
12.5.42.

Marched to LOIYA through HKODAUNG HILL TRACTS and heard that the Japs had captured MYITKYINA.

13.5.42.

1) Decided to march to INDIA along the following rough route: MYATDAUNG for R. IRRAWADDY – PINLEBYU – PAUNGBYIN (on R. CHINDWIN) – TAMU – IMPHAL.

2) Jem Thal Kul and 5 Chin mule leaders form 2 A.T. Coy proceeded independently.  Mule tpt & money were given them.  This party successfully reached the Chin Hills.

14.5.42.

1) Marched to SHWEDAUNGYI on the R. SHWELI & then met Mr TURNBULL[20] B. Fr Service [Burma Frontier Service] who confirmed that MYITKYINA had fallen.

2) Crossed R. SHWELI at night by raft, swimming the animals.

15.5.42

1) Received information that the enemy had reached MOLO on the R.SHWELI en route to SHEWDAUNGYI and NAMHLAM.  They were following up the retreating Chinese columns.

2) Joined by two Sowars from det Mtd Inf Tp which had proceeded independently on 8.5.42.  Party had been ambushed by Japs at SIN & the remainder of the party were taken prisoner.  One Sowar joined Jem That Kul’s party.

3) Jem Thal & his party joined forces with Mr Turnbull B. Fr Service.

15.5.42.

During night 15/16 May crossed a hack running from MABEIN to SIN. Japs reported to have sent tanks over this hack which runs through SUPIEN[?].  It is a fair weather track only, needing considerable improvement before being readily passable by M.T.

15.5.42}
16.5.42.}

Marched from SHWEDAUNGYI to PAGON on R. MAINGTHA.

17.5.42.

Marched to junction of Rivers MAINGTHA and SHWELI and crossed R. SHWELI below INGINBIN by dugouts which first had to be repaired.  Previously used by Chinese tps.

18.5.42.

1) Met party of about 15 (B.A.F. & civilians) personnel from BAWDWIN MINE.  They crossed the R. IRRAWADDY at KANNI and proceeded towards HOMALIN.

2) Reached banks of R. IRRAWADDY just north of MYATDAUNG.

3) Japs reported top be using about 100 boats on the river.  They were constructed of steel about 12 ft long.  They very seldom travelled by night.  These boats were capable of taking 12/14 men & were propelled by an outboard motor.  The enemy were also reported to be stopping at villages & collecting supplies etc.  Nearest enemy occupied posts were at INYWA and KATHA.

19.5.42.

1) Crossed R. IRRAWADDY by sampan NORTH of MYATDAUNG between 0500-0600 hrs.  Animals swam river in 2 stages, crossing to an island on night 18/19 May & completing crossing on 19 May.

2) We were unable to cross the river during darkness as villages were well armed and started firing as we approached the island.  From this stage until the R. CHINDWIN was reached villagers were generally very nervous and it was very difficult to enter a village after dark unless they had been warned of our approach by villagers sent on in advance for this purpose by us.

20.5.42.

Most villages had rifles & SAA. which they used for their defence against armed dacoits which were very widespread and prevalent throughout this area.  Reports were received of dacoits by day as well as by night.

20.5.42.

Marched to MAGYIBIN.

21.5.42.

1) Crossed railway line MDLY-MYITKYINA NORTH of GIN by night.  A train (armoured?) approached from the direction of NABA JUNC.  Villagers reported that the enemy had been using the line for some days & we heard other trains.

2) Japs reported to have posts at all large railway stations.  400 reported at WUNTHU and a smaller post at GIN.  Japs also reported to be at PINLEBYU in strength and using road WUNTU[sic]-PINLEBYU for transport of tps by M.T.

3) Camped about 3 mls WEST of railway line

4) There was also a fair weather road running parallel to the Railway used by the enemy.

22.5.42.}
23.5.42.}
24.5.42.}
25.5.42..}

1) Marched to HINNEBAN by a difficult jungle track.

2) As reported a large Japanese force was at PINLEBYU and parties of about 300 JAPS were proceeding daily up the R. MU (MU CHOUNG) branching off to THAYETKON en route to THAYOUNGON on R. CHINDWIN.  They were using a small jungle track.  Tracks were evidence supporting the villagers’ report.  Their track ran along the MU CHOUNG.  Villagers were being impressed as porters.

26.5.41}
to}
30.5.42}

1) Reached to a point near R, CHINDWIN about 24 mls down stream from SITTAUNG.

2) Unable to cross R. CHINDWIN at this point as Japs reported to have frequent river and track patrols by day and night.  Country boats were used in addition to outboard motor boats which were chiefly used by day.  Night patrols in country boats were very silent & were reported to be very quick on the trigger.  Patrols (enemy) were based on MAHIN village in this area.

3) The enemy were reported to be using about 40 boats similar in construction to those used on R. IRRAWADDY and were mainly employed in collecting and carrying supplies.

4) 7000 Japs were said to have marched up EAST bank of R. CHINDWIN by 20.5.42. en route to UPPER AUKTAUNG-PAUNGBYIN and THAYAUNG which were all strongly held.  Japs reported to have informed local guides that they were proceeding to HOMALIN.

31.5.42.

Marched 8 mls up R. CHINDWIN to neighbourhood of LOWER AUKTAUNG.

1) This march was along a track previously used by Japanese forces marching up EAST bank of R. CHINDWIN and was liberally marked by pieces of paper indicating direction and bearing unit code names.  Specimens are:

2) The Japs had treated the local population in the CHINDWIN area very harshly.  Patrols had removed all food and clothing and what they didn’t want they wantonly destroyed.  Requisitions made at the point of the bayonet & no payment made.  Villagers were being mistreated as coolies.  Jap troops reported to be very badly clothed & often without footwear of which they demanded from the villagers.

4) Further EAST in the BHAMO-NAMHKAM area it was reported that the Japs had been attempting to gain the support of the local population by the free distribution of clothing & even money & by opening of bazaars.

5) In the area R. IRRAWADDY-CHINDWIN all the villagers were very scared and were living in the jungle near their villages.  Near the R. IRRAWADDY they were frightened of the Chinese troops in addition to dacoits in the R. Chindwin area the Japs took the place of the Chinese.  Stragglers from Chinese units were behaving like armed dacoits in many cases and small parties of Chinese troops under Junior Officers also behaved badly.  The fear of Chinese troops was widespread and very great.

6) Throughout our march from TAUNGGYI we invariably found villagers friendly and helpful once their confidence had been gained.  The fact that there were two British Officers in our party who spoke Burmese was a great help and also the ready payment for all services & supplies.  At least 4 guides were always taken as they were frightened of the return journey.  Villagers only knew a ten mile radius from their own villages but knew the DIRECTION & names of large villages within 20 miles.  They were noticeably weak in guiding by night, even within a few miles of their own villages.  The above remarks in general apply to SHAN, PALAUNG–KACHIN & BURMAN villagers.

Copies (2) to D.A.A.G.  H.Q.  2nd Echelon (Burma)
                                    Jhansi

J.D. Tucker   Lt Col
Comd  14 Burif

War Diary of the 14th (Shan States) Bn B.T.F. for the month of June 1942

1.6.42.

1) Crossed CHINDWIN RIVER at night between LOWER AUKTAUNG and a point due EAST of KUDDU CHOUNG village.

2) Camped outside KUDDU CHOUNG village which is on the river.

2.6.42.
3.6.42.

Decided to proceed to ALEECHAUNG by the following route: KUDDU CHOUNG – WUNTHU – YAUNG YAUNG – PYAMAKYUT – ALEECHOUNG.

4.6.42.

The above hack is extremely difficult & is mainly along the beds of chaungs.  Huge rocks abound interspersed with smaller ones and there are several deep pools and stretches of water to negotiate.  it is an elephant hack passable to foot parties in dry weather.  Three elephants were hired from BBTC [Bombay Burma Trading Corporation] personnel in neighbourhood of KUDDU CHOUNG to carry our baggage, saddlery, food – our animals proceeded unloaded.  We lost one animal.  It took 3 days to travel 20 miles.  The track is unsuitable to animal tpt almost throughout its length.  Elephants returned from ALLEECHOUNG.

5.6.42.

Marched to vicinity of ALEECHOUNG near the YU CHOUNG.

6.6.42.

Crossed YU CHOUNG and camped near MAMAW YUWA (village) immediately EAST of road KALEMYO-TAMU.

This was the only area in which the local population were generally unfriendly.  We were greatly helped by employees of the BBTC Ltd who acted as guides and obtained the services of friendly Burmans.  The hostile attitude was put down as a result of the attitude of certain troops (unspecified) who had withdrawn up the road towards TAMU.

The enemy in the CHINDWIN area had been dropping pamphlets stating that villagers who did not disclose parties of British or Indian troops or Chinese troops or who helped these troops would be treated as enemies.

7.6.42

1) Crossed road KALEMYO-TAMU and marched to MAMAWCHINYUWA, inhabited by CHINS and on the BURMA border.  The monsoon arrived & there was heavy rain.

2) Marched to MINU-MAYANG-LAYSEN.

8.6.42.

Marched to MOLTUN.

9.6.42.

1) Marched to MOMBI.

2) Encountered a post manned by one Pl ASSAM RIF [Assam Rifles}.

10.6.42.

1) Marched to SHUGANU

2) Encountered an ASSAM RIF post (one coy less one pl).

3) Met two officers of 23 IND DIV [23rd Indian Infantry Division] supervising return of 350 Chins to CHIN HILLS

4) Jem Ngun Hai & two Chins from 2 A.T. Coy paid up & went back to Chin Hills.

11.6.42.

Remainder of party taken by Jeep to PALEIL [sic – Palel].

12.6.42.

1) Reported to 23 IND DIV and IV CORPS HQ.

2) Reported to 1 BURDIV [1st Burma Infantry Division] at M.S. 105 and received orders to proceed to RANCHI.

Party comprised the following;

Lt Col J.D. Tucker                   Comd 14 Burif
Capt J.A.E. Macpherson                      Ajt 14 Burif
Capt S.K. Mojumder                ABRO(M) attd 14 Burif
Jem Badhlawar Singh              Hd Grade Clerk 14 Burif
Hav Kaitan Singh                     1st Grade Clerk 14 Burif.
One Sowar (Sikh) from SSS Bn BFF (handed over to BFF Camp at M.S. 105.)
One private servant to Capt Mojumder.[21]

Copies (2) to D.A.A.G.  H.Q.  2nd Echelon (Burma)
                                    Jhansi

J.D. Tucker   Lt Col
Comd  14 Burif